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My thesis concerns about how public policies affect the performance of a 
closed economy.  We focus on the growth and welfare effects of these policies. 
We assume that the economy has perfectly competitive final-good and R&D 
sectors and monopolized intermediate-good sectors. We consider various 
policy comparisons in the following three chapters. All the three chapters draw 
on the same basic model, Romer’s 1990 model of technical progress through 
variety expansion. The main results mainly consist of basic analytical ones and 
numerical ones from simulations with particular parameter values as well as 
sensitivity analysis. 
Chapter 1 develops an endogenous growth model with innovation and human 
capital accumulation. In this model, both innovation and human capital 
accumulation drive economic growth. The growth rate of per capita income 
depends not only on consumers' preferences and human capital accumulation 
technologies, but also on firms' production and R&D technologies. 
Government policies such as subsidies to education and R&D influence the 
growth rate. We examine the steady-state and transitional effects of education 
and R&D subsidies on growth and welfare and the relative effectiveness of 
these subsidies. We find that although both the R&D and education subsidies 
enhance growth (and the latter generates a higher maximum growth rate than 
the former), the education subsidies improve welfare while the R&D subsidies 
do the opposite.
Chapter 2 examines optimal taxation in an R&D growth model with variety 
expansion. We develop two models. In the basic model, where final good is 
produced with intermediate good and labor, and intermediate goods are
produced with physical capital, we show that, for a given exogenous 
government expenditure, the optimal tax on physical capital income is always 
negative while the optimal tax on labor income is positive. The result is driven 
by the monopoly inefficiency in the intermediate-good sectors. Since the 
maximum amount of available labor is fixed, the labor income tax distortion is 
limited, thus it is always optimal to tax labor while subsidizing physical capital 
accumulation. However, in an extended model with human capital 
accumulation, the relationship between the growth rate and physical capital 
income tax rate depends on the values of the elasticity of marginal utility. In 
this model, it is optimal to tax physical capital income and subsidize human 
capital investments as long as the government expenditure is low enough. We 
find that the optimal policies in the extended model are different from those in 
the basic model due to the fact that in the extended model, the monopolized 
intermediate-good sectors have higher capital intensities and the taxation of 
labor income distorts not just the labor-leisure choice but also the rate of 
investment in human capital. Our dynamic analysis clearly shows that the 
physical capital income tax distortion decreases the welfare more than the 
labor income tax distortion in the basic model, while in the extended model 
with human capital, the ranking reverses.
Chapter 3 considers both fiscal and monetary policies in an R&D growth model
with variety expansion and money-in-production. We investigate how different 
government policies affect resource allocation, growth and welfare. More 
specifically, we compare two fiscal policies (a consumption tax and a capital 
income tax) and one monetary policy (inflation tax) as the instruments of 
financing the government expenditure. We show that given an exogenous 
government purchase and in the presence of consumption tax, both the 
growth-maximizing capital income tax and inflation tax should be negative. We 
find that the results are driven by the monopoly inefficiency which leads to less 
than optimal demands for both capital and real money. As a result, the
consumption tax will be most favourable. We also consider the case without 
the consumption tax and show that the capital income tax will be more 
favourable in terms of improving welfare, and the inflation tax will be more 
effective in terms of promoting growth.
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Part I
Chapter 1: R&D and Education
Subsidies in a Growth Model with
Innovation and Human Capital
Accumulation
1. Introduction
It is widely believed that human capital accumulation (education) and technological inno-
vation are the two main sources of economic growth. There is a huge literature on the
connections between education or innovation on the one hand and economic growth on the
other. Many studies focus on endogenous accumulation of human capital through education
and therefore emphasize the role of investments in education (e.g., Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988;
Rebelo, 1991). Using this types of models, several authors examine the roles of public edu-
cation/education subsidies in the process of human capital accumulation and growth (e.g.,
Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992; Kaganovich and Zilcha, 1999; Zhang and Richard 1998). In
particular, Lucas (1988) pointed out clearly that there be a positive education externality,
this calls for education subsidies. On the other hand, a large literature takes innovation as
the main engine of growth and thus emphasizes the role of investments in innovation activi-
ties (e.g., Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Grossman and Helpman, 1991). Empirical
studies, such as Jones and Williams, (1998, 2000) show a positive R&D externality. The
impact of R&D subsidies on growth and welfare is also intensively studied in these models
(e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004 (Chapter 6); Davidson and Segerstrom, 1998; Zeng and
Zhang, 2007).
However, in the modern economies, both education and innovation simultaneously drive
economic growth. They should not be treated as distinct causal factors, since human capital
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becomes more and more important as an input in innovation activities and new technologies
give more economic opportunities for investment in education to take place. As pointed
out by Romer (2000) in his discussion about U.S. government policies to encourage R&D
spending,“few participants in the political debate surrounding demand-subsidy policies seem
to have considered the broad range of alternative programs that could be considered.” So the
question is not whether public policy should promote growth and welfare but how to do it,
especially in the countries with tight government budget. For example, in 2012, individual
countries within the OECD experiecned large deficits, such as Ireland (8.1% of GDP) and
the United States (8.5%.) Outside the OECD, Brazil and China had deficits of around 2% of
GDP. Therefore, theoretically it is very important to integrate innovation and education into
a single framework to examine the interactions of the two driving forces and investigate the
relative effectiveness of the impact of alternative government policies on growth and welfare.
The objective of this chapter is to develop a dynamic general equilibrium growth model
with both innovation and human capital accumulation to study the relative effectiveness of
R&D and education subsidies in enhancing economic growth and welfare.1 We extend the
basic model in Romer (1990) by endogenizing human capital accumulation. To consider the
subsidies to physical investment in education, we assume that human capital accumulation
requires not only time input but also physical inputs such as classrooms and teaching equip-
ments. As in Romer (1990) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, Chapter 6), the laissez-faire
equilibrium is not socially optimal because of the inefficient monopoly pricing of the inter-
mediate goods and the positive externalizes associated with R&D. We then use the extended
model to numerically study how the R&D subsidies and education subsidies (to either the
physical inputs or time input) affect growth and welfare and compare the relative effective-
ness of these subsidies. We consider the impact of the subsidies both in the steady state and
1Recently, a few papers study issues similar to that in this chapter. Lloyd-Ellis and Roberts (2002)
examines the interaction between skills and technology in driving economic growth; Stadler (2012) integrates
human capital accumulation into an R&D growth model to investigate how education subsidies affect growth;
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during the transition to the steady state.
We find that both the R&D and education subsidies have positive effects on growth.
Moreover, the education subsidies are more effective than the R&D subsidies because the
latter can more effectively correct the static inefficiency resulting from the monopoly distor-
tion in the intermediate goods production. We also find that the education subsidies can
significantly raise welfare while the R&D subsidies reduce it. The reason for this is that
the subsidies and the taxes associated with the subsidies generate two offsetting forces –
one raises the growth rate (a gain in dynamic efficiency) and the other further mislocates
resources (a loss in static efficiency and that the negative force dominates. More closely
related to our analysis are the papers by Zeng (2003) and by Grossmann (2004). In Zeng
(2003), he incorporated innovation and human capital accumulation into one endogenous
growth model to see the growth effect of innovation subsidies and education subsidies. How-
ever, the analysis focuses on the growth effects without a comparison of the effectiveness.
Our model is on one hand more general by introducing elastic labor and on the other hand
considers not only the growth effects but compares the effectiveness of both the growth and
welfare effects of the two subsidies. Grossmann (2004) compared public education expendi-
ture on scientists and engineers and R&D subsidies in an overlapping-generations economy.
He claimed that R&D subsidies may be detrimental to both growth and welfare, but edu-
cation expenditure will not. This chapter while focuses on the analysis in a R&D growth
model with variety expansion and also compares R&D subsidies with more general education
subsidies instead of only with public education expenditure on scientists and engineers. The
rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 solves
the social planner’s problem. We use the solution as the reference point for the decentral-
ized equilibrium. Section 4 characterizes the decentralized equilibrium. Section 5 conducts
the steady-state analysis of the growth and welfare effect of the three subsidies. Section 6
performs the dynamic analysis, and the last section concludes.
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2. The model
The basic model is due to Romer (1990). We extend the model by incorporating human
capital accumulation. As a result, both physical and human capital are endogenously deter-
mined in our model. We describe the details of the economic environment in the following
sub-sections.
2.1 Technologies
There are five types of production activities in the economy: final good production, inter-
mediate good production, innovations, and physical and human capital accumulation. It is
assumed that there exists monopoly power in the intermediate good sectors while all the
other sectors are perfectly competitive.
2.1.1 Final good production
A final good producer uses a continuum of intermediate goods and a fixed factor as its inputs






αdi, A > 0, 0 < α < 1,
where the subscript t refers to time; A is a productivity parameter; α measures the con-
tribution of an intermediate good to the final good production and inversely measures the
intermediate monopolist’s market power; F is the quantity of the fixed factor; Yt is final
output; xti is the flow of intermediate good i; Nt is measure of intermediate goods. For
simplicity, we normalize the quantity of the fixed factor to unity (F = 1). We also omit the
time subscript t throughout the chapter whenever no confusion can arise. As a result, the





αdi, A > 0, 0 < α < 1, (1)
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, i ∈ [0, N ],
where pi is the price of intermediate good i in terms of the final good. The final good is used
as the numeraire for all prices.
2.1.2 Intermediate goods production
Each intermediate producer i who has a patented technology uses physical and human cap-





i , 0 < γ < 1, (2)
where γ measures the contribution of physical capital to the intermediate good production.
Given the wage rate w, the interest rate r, and the final good sector’s demand for interme-
diate goods given by equation (1), each intermediate good producer chooses the amounts of
physical and human capital to maximize its profit
pii = pixi − wmi − rki = αAkαγi mα(1−γ)i − wmi − rki.
The solution to this maximization problem gives the demand functions for ki and mi.
These in turn give the output xi and profit pii of a intermediate good producer
mi = m = φ(1− γ)r, (3)
ki = k = φwγ, (4)
xi = x = [(1− γ)r]1−γ(wγ)γφ, (5)
pii = pi = αA[(1− γ)r]α(1−γ)(wγ)αγφα − wφr, (6)




1−α (1 − γ)α(1−γ)1−α γ αγ1−αw αγ−11−α r α(1−γ)−11−α . Here, both xi and pii are functions of




The R&D sector is perfectly competitive and the innovation process is deterministic. An
innovator invests η units of final good to discover a technology to produce a new intermediate
good. The innovator becomes the sole producer of the intermediate good forever. The
value of a new technology equals the present value of the profits from producing the new












Assuming free entry in the R&D sector, we have
V = (1− sη)η, (8)
where sη is a subsidy to the investment in R&D. From equation (7), we obtain
V˙ = pi − rV, (9)
where a dot on the top of a variable represents the time change rate of that variable. Com-





which holds true both in and outside the steady state.
2.3 Households
The model economy is populated by a continuum of identical infinitely-lived households
with measure one. The representative household is endowed with 1 unit of time which is
inelastically allocated among intermediate goods production u, human capital accumulation





1− σ exp(−ρt)dt, (11)
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where C is per capital consumption; ρ is the constant rate of time preference; and σ is
the elasticity of marginal utility; ε is the elasticity of leisure; and l is the amount of time
allocated to leisure. The household accumulates human capital H according to
H˙ = BDβ(vH)1−β, 0 ≤ β < 1, (12)
where B is a productivity parameter and D is physical input in education.
The human capital production technology has been widely used in the literature (e.g.
Rebelo, 1991; Stokey and Rebelo, 1995). It is easy to understand that in real world human
capital accumulation depends on the physical inputs such as equipments for teaching, lab
for experiments and the amount of time devoted to learning. Bowen(1987) and Jones and
Zimmer (2001) both suggest that physical investment plays a significant role in the education
sector. The representative household has a budget constraint
(1 + τc)C = (1− τk)rK + (1− τh)wuH − (1− sk)K˙
−(1− sd)D + svwvH + PF + χ− ζ, (13)
where K is capital stock; PF is the price of the fixed factor; χ is the dividends; ζ is the cost
of R&D; (τc, τk and τh) are respectively the taxes on consumption, physical capital income
and labor income; and (sk, sd and sv) are respectively the subsidies to physical investment,
human capital investment and educational time.
2.4 Government budget
Assume that the government’s budget is balanced at each point in time, then we have
τcC + τkrK + τhwuH = skK˙ + sdD + svwvH + sηηN˙, (14)
where the left-hand side is the total tax revenue from consumption (τcC), capital income
(τkrK) and labor income (τhwuH) while the right-hand side is the total expenditure on
subsidies to investment in physical capital (skK˙), physical inputs in education (sdD), time
spent on education (svwvH) and investment in R&D (sηηN˙).
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3. Socially optimal solution
In this section, we solve the social planner’s problem and use the solution as the reference
point to examine the properties of the decentralized equilibrium. Since all the intermediate
goods enter the production of final good symmetrically, the quantities of intermediate goods
will be the same, i.e., xi = x, for all i ∈ [0, N ]. As a result, ki = k and mi = m for all
i ∈ [0, N ]. The resources constraints for physical and human capital, ∫N0 kidi = Nk = K
and
∫N
0 midi = Nm = uH, give the amounts of physical and human capital used in the








Using equation (15), we can rewrite equation (1) as
Y = AN1−αKαγ(uH)α(1−γ). (16)
The social planner then chooses consumption (C), investments in education (D) and R&D
(I) and time allocation (u, l) to maximize the representative household’s utility equation (11)
subject to the human capital accumulation technology equation (12) and the following final
output constraint and R&D technology









1− σ + µ1BD
β[(1− u− l)H]1−β
+µ2[AN
1−αKαγ(uH)α(1−γ) − C −D − I] + µ3I/η,
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where µ1, µ2 and µ3 are respectively the co-state variables associated with equations (12),
(17) and (18). The first-order conditions for this optimization problem are equations (12),
(17), (18) and the following conditions
C−σlε(1−σ) = µ2, (19)
βµ1BD
β−1[(1− u− l)H]1−β = µ2, (20)
µ2 = µ3/η, (21)
(1− β)µ1BDβH1−β(1− u− l)−β = α(1− γ)µ2Y/u, (22)
εC1−σl
ε(1−σ)−1 = (1− β)µ1BDβH1−β(1− u− l)−β, (23)
(1− β)µ1BDβ(1− u− l)1−βH−β + α(1− γ)µ2Y/H = −µ˙1 + ρµ1, (24)
αγµ2Y/K = −µ˙2 + ρµ2, (25)
(1− α)µ2Y/N = −µ˙3 + ρµ3, (26)
lim
t→∞ e
−ρtµ1tHt = 0, (27)
lim
t→∞ e
−ρtµ2tKt = 0, (28)
lim
t→∞ e
−ρtµ3tNt = 0. (29)
Equation (19) (respectively, (20), (21), (22), (23)) equalizes the social marginal benefit and
social marginal cost of consumption (respectively, physical investment in education, invest-
ment in R&D, time allocated to production, time allocated to leisure). Equations (24) and
(27) (respectively (25) and (28), (26) and (29) ) are the socially optimal dynamic conditions
for human capital (respectively, physical capital, variety) accumulation.
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We now solve the above first-order conditions. From equations (21), (25) and (26), we
have: K/N = αγη/(1 − α) and K˙ = αγηN˙/(1 − α). With K˙ = αγηN˙/(1 − α), equations












(Y − C −D). (31)








Combining equations (20) and (22), we have
D =
[









































The dynamics of the socially planned economy are then described by the system of equations
(12), (16) and (30)-(35), along with an initial condition (H0, K0, N0) and the transversally
conditions equations (27)-(29). In a steady state, the time allocation (u, l) is constant and
all the other variables (consumption C, physical investment in education D, investment in
10
R&D I, the number of intermediate goods N , physical capital stock K, human capital stock
H and final output Y ) grow at the same constant rate g. That is, u˙ = l˙ = 0 and X˙/X = g,
where X = C,D, I,N,K,H and Y . We now derive the steady-state equilibrium conditions





[αγAN1−αKαγ−1(uH)α(1−γ) − ρ] (36)
Similarly, from equations (22) and (24), we obtain
u = (1− l)[1− (1− β)Φ(g)] (37)
Combining equations (12), (33), (36) and (37) gives the first equilibrium condition
α
β
α(1−γ) (σg + ρ)q = Ω(1− l) (38)
where q ≡ 1 + β(αγ+1−α)





α(1−γ) (1 − α)
β(1−α)
α(1−γ)








α(γ−1) . Next, from equations (32),(33) and (37), we have
C =
{
αη(1− γ)(σg + ρ)l
ε(1− α)(1− l)[1− (1− β)Φ(g)]
}
N and D =
{
αβη(1− γ)g
(1− α)[1− (1− β)Φ(g)]
}
N,
where Φ(g) ≡ g
gσ+ρ
. Substituting the above expressions into equation (31), we obtain the
second equilibrium condition
(αγ + 1− α)Φ(g) = 1−
α(1− γ)[ l
ε(1−l) + βΦ(g)]
1− (1− β)Φ(g) . (39)
Equations (38) and (39) determine the socially optimal growth rate and leisure (g∗, l∗).
Solving equation (38) for l and substituting it into equation (39), we obtain the following
condition that determines the socially optimal growth rate






ε[1− (αγ + 1− α)Φ(g)][1− (1− β)Φ(g)]
α(1− γ) − βεΦ(g) + 1
}
− Ω = 0.
(40)
The existence and uniqueness of the solution are given by
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Proposition 1: If (i) σ > 2− [β + α(1− γ)(1− β)] and (ii) Ω > α βα(1−γ)ρq[1 + ε/α(1− γ)],
then there always exists a unique positive growth rate of per capita output.
Proof. (a) We have J ′(g) > 0 because




α(1− γ) {σq(gσ + ρ) {[1− (αγ + 1− α)Φ(g)][1− (1− β)Φ(g)]
−βΦ(g)α(1− γ) + α(1− γ)/ε} − (αγ + 1− α)ρ− (1− β)ρ
+2(αγ + 1− α)(1− β)Φ(g)ρ− βρα(1− γ)} > 0
if condition (i) holds true. (b) We have J(0) = α
β
α(1−γ)ρq[1 + ε/α(1−γ)]−Ω < 0 if condition
(ii) holds true. (c) Obviously, J(∞) = ∞ > 0. By the intermediate value theorem, there
must exist a unique positive growth rate g∗ ∈ (0,∞) such that J(g) = 0. Q.E.D.
The second condition in this proposition is just equivalent to the condition that the
marginal social benefit of investing in R&D (µ3/η) is greater than its marginal cost(µ2), i.e.,
µ3/µ2 > η. Consider the economy in a steady with no growth (g = 0). When g = 0, then
I = D = v = 0, l = ε
α(1−γ)+ε , u =
α(1−γ)
α(1−γ)+ε , K =
αγη









−1(1− γ)ηρ1− 1β 2 and Y/N = C/N = ρη








= (1− α)AKαγ(uH)α(1−γ) = B α(1−γ)β(1−α) (Aαα) 11−α (1− α)








Rewriting the condition µ3/µ2 > η gives Ω > α
β
α(1−γ)ρq[1+ε/α(1−γ)]. That is, the marginal
social benefit of investing in R&D is greater than its marginal cost. Therefore, it is optimal for
the social planner to allocate its sources to the R&D sector. The condition can be guaranteed
by various sufficient conditions concerning the values of the technology and preferences such




β−1α(1− α)−1β(1− β) 1β−1(1− γ)η(σg + ρ)1− 1β , when g 6= 0,
we take the limit when g approaches to 0 to get the value for H/N
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as a sufficiently low subjective discount rate (low ρ), a sufficiently productive human capital
accumulation technology (large B), a sufficiently productive parameter for all intermediate
goods (large A), a sufficiently low cost of innovation (low η), a sufficiently low elasticity of
leisure (low ε), and a sufficiently large elasticity of marginal utility (high σ).
4. Decentralized equilibrium
In this section , we will first solve the representative household’s optimization problem. We
then use the first-order conditions for this optimization problem and the first-order conditions
for (final good, intermediate good and R&D) firms’ profit maximization problems to derive
a system of equations that describe the dynamics of the decentralized economy. At the end
of this section, we compare the decentralized equilibrium with the socially optimal solution
to examine the properties of the decentralized equilibrium.
The representative household chooses consumption C, investment in education D, the
time allocation u and l to maximize its life-time utility, subject to the human capital accu-
mulation technology and the budget constraint. The current-value Hamiltonian function for
this optimization problem is
LDE = (Cl
ε)1−σ − 1
1− σ + λ1BD
β[(1− u− l)H]1−β + λ2 1
1− sk [(1− τk)rK + (1− τh)wuH
−(1 + τc)C − (1− sd)D + svwvH + PF + χ− ζ],
where λ1t and λ2t are respectively the co-state variables associated with equations (12) and




1− sk , (42)
βλ1BD
β−1[(1− u− l)H]1−β = λ2(1− sd)
1− sk , (43)
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εC1−σl
ε(1−σ)−1 = (1− β)λ1BDβH1−β(1− u− l)−β + λ2svwH
1− sk , (44)
(1− β)λ1BDβH1−β(1− u− l)−β = λ2[(1− τh)wH − svwH]
1− sk , (45)
(1− β)λ1BDβ(1− u− l)1−βH−β + λ2[(1− τh)wu+ svwv]
1− sk = −λ˙1 + ρλ1, (46)
λ2r(1− τk)
1− sk = −λ˙2 + ρλ2, (47)
lim
t→∞ e
−ρtλ1tHt = 0, (48)
lim
t→∞ e
−ρtλ2tKt = 0. (49)
Equation (42) (respectively, (43), (44), (45)) equalizes the private marginal benefit and
private marginal cost of consumption (respectively, physical investment in education, time
allocated to leisure, time allocated to production). Equations (46) and (48) (respectively
(47) and (49) ) are the optimal dynamic conditions for human capital (respectively, physical
capital) accumulation.
We now derive the equilibrium conditions. According to equation (5), we know that all
the intermediate good producers will produce the same quantity, so we have xi = x. Using
the capital and labor market clearing conditions, i.e.,
∫N
0 kidi = Nk = K and
∫N
0 midi =
Nm = uH, we have k = K/N , m = uH/N and x = Kγ(uH)1−γ/N . Since each intermediate
good enters the production of final good symmetrically, we can rewrite equation (1) as
equation (16) as in the social planner’s problem. From equations (42) and (44), we obtain







Combining equations (43) and (45), we have
D =
[





From equations (8) and (10), we have K/N = αγ(1 − sη)η/(1 − α) 3and thus K˙ = αγ(1 −
sη)ηN˙/(1− α). With K˙ = αγ(1− sη)ηN˙/(1− α), the final goods market clearing condition




η(1− α(1− γ(1− sη)))
]




1− α(1− γ(1− sη))
]
(Y − C −D). (53)
From equations (52) and (53), we can easily see that an increase in the R&D subsidy (sη)
speed up the expansion of varieties while the same change slows down the accumulation
of physical capital. Equations (3) and (4), along with k = K/N and m = uH/N , gives
r = α2γY/K and w = α2(1 − γ)Y/(uH). Substituting the expressions for r and w into













We can see from equations (54) and (55) that an increase in the tax on consumption (τc)
or labor income (τh) will reduce the share of consumption in final output. An increase in
the tax on labor income (τh) or the subsidy to educational time (sv) will decrease the share
of physical investment in final output while a rise in the subsidy to physical investment in
education will increase this share. We then solve equations (42), (43), (45), (47), (54) and














3From equations (8) and (10), we have pir = (1−sη)η. Also from the intermediate goods production sector,
we know the profit is proportional to the final output, i.e., piy = α(1− α). Lastly, capital income rk = α2γy
could also be derived. The three equations give us a constant value of k = K/N = αγ(1 − sη)η/(1 − α).
The main reason is that in the model we have a constant innovation cost, i.e., to increase N by 1, the cost





u(1− τh) + svv








σ − (1− σ)
]σBu(1− τh) + svv1− τh − sv
[
D





1− β − 1
)
Y
(1− sk)K − ρ
}
. (57)
The dynamics of the decentralized economy are then characterized by the system of equations
(12), (16), (52), (53), (54), (55), (56) and (57), along with an initial condition (H0, K0, N0)
and the transversality conditions equations (48) and (49). In a steady state, the time allo-
cation (u, l) is constant and all the other variables (consumption C, physical investment in
education D, the number of intermediate goods N , physical capital stock K, human capital
stock H and final output Y ) grow at the same constant rate g. That is, u˙ = l˙ = 0 and
X˙/X = g, where X = C,D,N,K,H and Y . We now derive the steady-state equilibrium
conditions that determine the decentralized economy growth rate (g) and leisure (l). From











(gσ + ρ)(1− sk)
(1− τk) .




(gσ + ρ)(1− sk)η
α(1− α)(1− τk) . (59)





1− τh − sv (1− l), (60)
u =
(gσ + ρ)(1− τh − sv)− (1− β)g(1− τh)
(gσ + ρ)(1− τh − sv) (1− l). (61)
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Using equations (59), (60) and (61), we can rewrite equations (54) and (55) as
C =
{
l(1− τh)(1− τh − sv)α(1− γ)(gσ + ρ)(1− sk)(1− sη)η





Φ(g)β(1− τh)(1− τh − sv)α(1− γ)(gσ + ρ)(1− sk)(1− sη)η
(1− sd)[(1− τh − sv)− (1− β)Φ(g)(1− τh)](1− α)(1− τk)
}
N. (63)
Combining equations (62), (63) and the final goods market clearing condition K˙ = Y −C −
D − ηN˙ , we obtain the first equilibrium condition
α[αγ(1− sη) + 1− α](1− τk)
(1− sη)(1− sk) Φ(g) =
1−







(1− τh − sv)− (1− β)Φ(g)(1− τh) . (64)
As in the social planner’ problem, we combine equations (12), (55), (61) and (58) to
obtain the other equilibrium condition
(gσ + ρ)q = ΩΨ(1− l), (65)









By now we have reduced the equilibrium system of equations to the two conditions (equations
(64) and (65)) that determine the growth rate g and time devoted to leisure time l. This
steady-state equilibrium has the following features: First, there is no scale effect in terms of
the size of population, as in those recent non-scale endogenous growth models (Jones, 1995;
Kortum, 1997; Segerstrom, 1998; Young, 1998; Howitt, 1999; Zeng and Zhang, 2002). This
is because the scale effect is nullified by human capital accumulation. Second, the long run
growth rate depends on preferences, human capital accumulation and R&D activities as long
as 0 < β < 1. Third, similar to some R&D models without scale effects (e.g., Aghion and
Howitt, 1998; Howitt, 1999), government policies such as taxes on physical, labor incomes
and consumption and subsidies to R&D , investments in physical and human capital and
time allocated to human accumulation have permanent effects on growth.
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Next, we find the conditions under which there exists a unique steady-state equilibrium.
For simplicity, we consider a laissez faire equilibrium. Without government intervention, the
equilibrium conditions equations (64) and (65) are simplified to4
(gσ + ρ)q = Ω(1− l), (66)
and
(αγ + 1− α)αΦ(g) = 1−
α2(1− γ)[ l
ε(1−l) + βΦ(g)]
1− (1− β)Φ(g) . (67)
Solving equation (66) for l and substituting it into equation (67), we can further simplify the
equilibrium conditions to the following condition that determines the long-run decentralized
equilibrium growth rate g
E(g) ≡ (gσ + ρ)q
{
ε[1− α(αγ + 1− α)Φ(g)][1− (1− β)Φ(g)]
α2(1− γ) − βεΦ(g) + 1
}
− Ω = 0.
(68)
The existence and uniqueness of the steady-state equilibrium are given by
Proposition 2: If (i) σ > 1− [β − α+ α2(1− γ)(1− β)] and (ii) Ω > ρq[1 + ε/α2(1− γ)] ,
then there always exists a unique positive growth rate of per capita output.
Proof. (a) We have E ′(g) > 0 because
E ′(g) =
ε(gσ + ρ)q−2
α2(1− γ) {σq(gσ + ρ) {[1− α(αγ + 1− α)Φ(g)][1− (1− β)Φ(g)]
−βΦ(g)α2(1− γ) + α2(1− γ)/ε
}
− α(αγ + 1− α)ρ− (1− β)ρ
+2α(αγ + 1− α)(1− β)Φ(g)ρ− βρα2(1− γ)
}
> 0
4When human capital accumulation does not require physical inputs (β = 0), the equilibrium conditions
equations (66) and (67) becomes gσ+ ρ = B(1− l) and (αγ+ 1−α)αΦ(g) = 1−α2(1− γ) lε(1−l)/(1−Φ(g)).
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if condition (i) holds true. (b) We have E(0) = ρq[1 + ε/α2(1− γ)]− Ω < 0 if condition (ii)
holds true. (c) Obviously, E(∞) = ∞ > 0. By the intermediate value theorem, there must
exist a unique positive growth rate g˜ ∈ (0,∞) such that E(g) = 0. Q.E.D.
The second condition in this proposition is equivalent to the condition that V > η. As
in the social planner’s problem, consider the economy in a steady state with no growth
(g = 0). When g = 0, we have D = I = v = 0, l = ε
α2(1−γ)+ε , u =
α2(1−γ)
























Then the condition V > η leads to Ω > ρq[1+ε/α2(1−γ)]. Since the marginal private benefit
of investing in R&D is greater than its marginal cost, it is optimal for the profit-maximizing
R&D firms to invest in R&D until V = η.
This condition can be guaranteed by various sufficient conditions concerning the values
of the technology and preferences such as a sufficiently low subjective discount rate (low
ρ), a sufficiently productive human capital accumulation technology (large B), a sufficiently
productive parameter for all intermediate goods (large A), a sufficiently low cost of innovation
(low η), and a sufficiently low elasticity of leisure (low ε).
Comparing the decentralized steady-state equilibrium with the socially optimal steady-
state solution, we can see that the decentralized economy has a lower growth rate and a
higher level of leisure. More formally, we have
19
Proposition 3: If (i) σ > 2− [β + α(1− γ)(1− β)] and (ii) Ω > ρq[1 + ε/α2(1− γ)], then
the decentralized economy has a lower growth rate and a higher level of leisure compared with
the socially optimal solution. i.e., g˜ < g∗ and l˜ > l∗.
Proof. (a) By definitions, we have J(g∗) = E(g˜) = 0. We also have J(g) < E(g) ∀ g. As a
result, g˜ < g∗. (b) Since l˜
1−l˜ =
ε




α(1−γ) [1− (αγ+ 1−α)Φ(g∗)][1− (1−β)Φ(g∗)]−βεΦ(g∗) + 1, we have l˜ > l∗. Q.E.D.
As in the R&D model with variety expansion in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, Chapter
6), the decentralized equilibrium is sub-optimal in our model because of the existence of
monopoly power in the intermediate good sector and the knowledge spillover from R&D.
On the one hand, monopoly pricing in the intermediate good sector leads to a lower than
optimal level of demand for labor (human capital) and thus a greater than optimal level
of leisure (static inefficiency). On the other hand, the positive externality generated by
knowledge spillover from R&D results in less than optimal investment in R&D and thus too
low a growth rate (dynamic inefficiency).
5. Steady state results
From Proposition 3, we know that the steady-state laissez-faire equilibrium is not optimal, in
particular, the level of leisure is too high and the growth rate is too low. In this section, we
consider how the government can intervene to move the steady-state equilibrium towards the
first best solution. We consider two commonly-used policies: R&D subsidies and education
subsidies (to either physical inputs or time input). These subsidies are financed by a uniform
tax rate (τk = τh = τ) on physical capital and labor income.







1−sd + (1− β)sv(1− τ)Φ(g)
]
1− τ − sv − (1− β)(1− τ)Φ(g) =
(1− α)sηΦ(g)
α(1− sη) . (69)
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In addition, we can express the household’s welfare (in terms of l ,g and subsidies) as
U =
l(+1)(1−σ)
(1− σ)(ρ− g + σg)
[
α(1− γ)(σg + ρ)η(1− sη)
ε(1− α)(1− (1− β)Φ(g))(1− l)
]1−σ
− 1
ρ(1− σ) , (70)
which is the integral of the consumer’s utility function along the steady state path.
Given the equilibrium conditions, equations (64) and (65), the government budget con-
straint equation (69) and the welfare function equation (70), we are now in a position to
examine the long-run effects of the two types of subsidies on growth and welfare. Since the
equilibrium equations are highly non-linear, analytical results are difficult to obtain. We do
numerical simulations instead.
To do the simulations, we first need to specify the values of the model’s parameters in
a benchmark economy. We have preference parameters (ε, σ, ρ) and technology parameters
(α, β, γ, A,B, η). First, using the parameter values employed by the growth calibration
exercises in Lucas (1990), King and Rebelo (1990), and Stokey and Rebelo (1995), we set
(σ, ρ, α, γ ) = (1.5, 0.05, 0.8, 0.35) (implying a labor’s share of 0.7). In the absence of more
precise information about the human capital technology, we set β equal to 0.5 which is close
to the value used in in King and Rebelo (1990).
Following Prescott(1986), we choose ε to be 0.2, implying that the representative house-
hold spends about 30 per cent of its available time working. The last three parameters
(A,B, η) = (0.5, 0.5, 1) are chosen for the steady-state equilibrium to generate a growth rate
close to that for the US economy (3%).
Given the values of the model’s parameters we have chosen, we can now simulate the
model. Table 1.1 reports the growth rate and leisure in the laissez-faire equilibrium and the
socially optimal solution. As expected, the equilibrium growth rate (2.60%) is substantially
lower than the optimal growth rate (3.9%) while the equilibrium level of leisure (0.25) is
significantly higher than the optimal level (0.18).
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Table 1.1: Steady state results of decentralized economy and social optimal
Parameters: α = 0.8,β = 0.5,γ = 0.35,σ = 1.5, η = 1, ρ = 0.05,  = 0.2,A = B = 0.5
Growth rate Leisure
Decentralized economy 0.0260 0.2511
Socially optimal problem 0.03959 0.1830
Tables 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 respectively show the growth and welfare effects of the subsidies
to R&D, physical investment in education and educational time. 5 It is clear that starting
with a equilibrium with a lower growth rate and a higher level of leisure, an increase in
the R&D subsidy (respectively, the subsidy to physical investment in education, subsidy to
educational time) encourages R&D investment (respectively, physical investment in educa-
tion, time investment in education) and thus stimulate economic growth. However, on the
other hand, an accompanying increase in the labor income tax discourages physical and time
investments in education (and thus raising leisure further above its socially optimal level);
Similarly, an increase in the physical capital income tax decreases discourages investment
in physical capital. As a result, the income taxes tend to reduce the growth rate. When
the subsidy rate is low (for the three subsidies), the tax distortion is weak, leading to a
net increase in the growth rate. When the subsidy rate is high enough, the tax distortion
becomes stronger and eventually dominates the positive growth effect, leading to a lower
growth rate. In other words, there exists a positive rate of the subsidy at which growth is
maximized.
5In the simulation, we first express taxation rate in terms of subsidy rate according to equation (69),
except for time subsidy sv (table 1.4), in which we express subsidy rate in terms of taxation rate, since the
expression of taxation rate in terms of subsidy rate is more complicated.
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Table 1.2: Growth and welfare effects of R&D subsidies.
sη Growth rate Leisure Consumption per intermediate good Welfare
0 0.0260 0.2511 0.4543 -14.0829
0.04 0.0262 0.2510 0.4377 -15.0077
0.08 0.0264 0.2509 0.4211 -15.9916
0.12 0.0266 0.2509 0.4044 -17.0413
0.16 0.0268 0.2509 0.3877 -18.1647
0.2 0.0270 0.2509 0.3709 -19.3712
0.24 0.0272 0.2510 0.3539 -20.6717
0.28 0.0275 0.2511 0.3369 -22.0795
0.32 0.0277 0.2513 0.3198 -23.6107
0.36 0.0279 0.2516 0.3027 -25.2847
0.40 0.0280 0.2520 0.2854 -27.1255
0.44 0.0282 0.2525 0.2679 -29.1636
0.48 0.0283 0.2531 0.2504 -31.4376
0.52 0.0285 0.2539 0.2328 -33.9973
0.56 0.02860 0.2550 0.2150 -36.9089
0.60 0.02865 0.2563 0.1970 -40.2620
0.64 0.02864 0.2581 0.1789 -44.1812
0.68 0.0285 0.2604 0.1606 -48.8459
0.72 0.0283 0.2634 0.1421 -54.5256
0.76 0.0279 0.2675 0.1233 -61.6465
0.80 0.0271 0.2733 0.1043 -70.9288
0.84 0.0260 0.2816 0.0850 -83.7064
0.88 0.0240 0.2946 0.0651 -102.7971
0.92 0.0207 0.3167 0.0448 -135.5485
0.96 0.0147 0.3621 0.0237 -210.9592
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Table 1.3: Growth and welfare effects of education subsidies.
sd Growth rate Leisure Consumption per intermediate good Welfare
0 0.0260 0.2511 0.4543 -14.0829
0.04 0.0267 0.2503 0.4589 -13.5335
0.08 0.0274 0.2496 0.4637 -12.9710
0.12 0.0281 0.2490 0.4688 -12.3948
0.16 0.0289 0.2484 0.4743 -11.8040
0.2 0.0296 0.2478 0.4800 -11.1978
0.24 0.0304 0.2474 0.4862 -10.5753
0.28 0.0313 0.2470 0.4926 -9.9356
0.32 0.0321 0.2468 0.4996 -9.2774
0.36 0.0329 0.24676 0.5072 -8.5996
0.40 0.0338 0.24672 0.5153 -7.9008
0.44 0.0347 0.2470 0.5241 -7.1792
0.48 0.0356 0.2475 0.5338 -6.4332
0.52 0.0365 0.2483 0.5445 -5.6605
0.56 0.0374 0.2495 0.5563 -4.8585
0.60 0.0382 0.2513 0.5696 -4.0244
0.64 0.0390 0.2537 0.5848 -3.1541
0.68 0.0398 0.2570 0.6022 -2.2428
0.72 0.0404 0.2615 0.6229 -1.2840
0.76 0.0408 0.2679 0.6478 -0.2686
0.80 0.0409 0.2770 0.6789 0.8172
0.84 0.0404 0.2904 0.7197 1.9960
0.88 0.0390 0.3114 0.7772 3.3089
0.92 0.0357 0.3480 0.8683 4.8471
0.96 0.0283 0.4259 1.0525 6.8998
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Table 1.4: Growth and welfare effects of time subsidies.
τ sv Growth rate Leisure Consumption per intermediate good Welfare
0 0 0.0260 0.2511 0.4543 -14.0829
0.04 0.2308 0.0307 0.2405 0.5013 -9.8327
0.08 0.3407 0.0334 0.2338 0.5413 -7.0936
0.12 0.4015 0.0352 0.2288 0.5789 -5.0572
0.16 0.4359 0.0362 0.2248 0.6158 -3.4378
0.2 0.4539 0.0367 0.2216 0.6528 -2.0956
0.24 0.4610 0.0368 0.2190 0.6907 -0.9501
We compare the magnitudes of the growth effects of the subsidies in Table 1.5. In general,
if only one subsidy is varied at a time, setting the other ones 0, comparing the growth
rates at the growth-maximizing subsidy rate, we find that education subsidies (sd, sv) are
more effective than R&D subsidies (sη) in promoting growth. Although the R&D subsidies
directly lower the cost of R&D investment (which improves dynamic efficiency), their tax
distortions increase the share of time allocated to leisure further above the social optimal
level, and decreases the share of time allocated to production and education further more
below the social optimal level (which reduces static efficiency). While the tax distortions
of financing education subsidies are similar to those in the case with R&D subsidies, the
education subsidies promote growth by encouraging physical or time investment in human
capital accumulation and at the same time decreasing the share of time allocated to leisure
(which improves both static and dynamic efficiency). It turns out that education subsidies
are more effective than R&D subsidies in stimulating economic growth. Comparing the two
education subsidies (sd, sv) in the benchmark case, we also find that subsidizing physical
inputs education (sd) is more effective than subsidizing educational time (sv).
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Table 1.5: Growth-maximizing subsidies.
Parameters: α = 0.8,β = 0.5,γ = 0.35,σ = 1.5, η = 1, ρ = 0.05,  = 0.2,A = B = 0.5
sη sd sv
Subsidy rate Growth rate Subsidy rate Growth rate Subsidy rate Growth rate
Benchmark results
0.6 0.0287 0.8 0.0409 0.4611 0.0368
Sensitivity analysis
α = 0.5 0.68 0.0110 0.8 0.0127 0.5833 0.0130
α = 0.9 0.6 0.0379 0.8 0.0567 0.4333 0.0486
β = 0.2 0.32 0.0761 0.8 0.0917 0.2605 0.1036
β = 0.8 0.68 0.2131 0.76 0.3063 0.6324 0.0206
γ = 0.2 0.6 0.0309 0.8 0.0459 0.4284 0.0402
γ = 0.8 0.52 0.0490 0.68 0.0517 0.4993 0.0520
σ = 2 0.72 0.0218 0.84 0.0341 0.5120 0.0302
σ = 2.5 0.76 0.0178 0.88 0.0298 0.5494 0.0257
ρ = 0.03 0.4 0.0425 0.68 0.0501 0.3807 0.0473
ρ = 0.08 0.84 0.0117 0.88 0.0298 0.5587 0.0246
 = 0.1 0.6 0.0346 0.8 0.0474 0.4398 0.0418
 = 0.3 0.64 0.024 0.8 0.0356 0.4739 0.0326
Changes in the model’s parameters do not reverse the ranking of education subsidies
(sd, sv) and R&D subsidies (sη), but changes in the parameters may reverse the ranking
of the two education subsidies (sd, sv). For example, when β decreases to 0.2, the subsidy
to educational time (sv) is more effective than the subsidy to physical investment (sd).
This is mainly because, β measures the contribution of physical investment to education,
while (1− β) measures the contribution of time investment to education. We find that the
relative effectiveness of the two education subsidies (sd, sv) varies with the values of several
parameters. Thus, the governments should rank and choose the two different education
subsidies according to the relative contribution of physical input and time input in their
countries. Bowen (1987) estimated that D account for 22% of the total explicit cost of
acquiring higher education. And it is clear, as technology advances, physical investment is
playing an increasingly important role in education. Thus, the government should pay more
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attention to the physical input subsidies. Result 1 summarizes the results concerning the
growth effects of subsidies.
Result 1: The education subsidies are always more effective than the R&D subsidies in s-
timulating growth. However, the relative effectiveness of the two education subsidies depends
on the values of the model’s parameters.
We also consider the combinations of R&D subsidy and educational subsidies, e.g., a combi-
nation of R&D subsidies and physical input subsides, the growth-maximizing combination of
the R&D subsidies and physical input subsidies are (0.6, 0.72), generating a higher maximiz-
ing growth rate at 0.4124 then using each of them alone. The welfare effects of the subsidies
are reported in Table 1.6. Similar to the ranking of the subsidies in terms of their growth
effects, the education subsidies (sd, sv) always produce a higher level of welfare than the
R&D subsidies (sη). The reasons for this result are similar to those for the growth effects.
Table 1.6: Welfare-maximizing subsidies.
Parameters: α = 0.8,β = 0.5,γ = 0.35,σ = 1.5, η = 1, ρ = 0.05,  = 0.2,A = B = 0.5
sη sd sv
Subsidy rate Welfare Subsidy rate Welfare Subsidy rate Welfare
Benchmark results
0 -14.0829 0.96 6.8998 0.4611 -0.9501
Sensitivity analysis
α = 0.5 0 -46.9112 0.92 -19.0582 0.5833 -26.9166
α = 0.9 0 3.1861 0.96 17.0181 0.4345 12.8125
β = 0.2 0 9.4796 0.96 20.0002 0.2605 20.6332
β = 0.8 0 -21.999 0.96 2.9759 0.6830 -14.738
γ = 0.2 0 -12.7015 0.96 11.7034 0.4284 1.6116
γ = 0.8 0 -0.51914 0.84 3.4480 0.5541 4.1692
σ = 2 0 -19.8912 0.96 5.5489 0.5120 -1.6657
σ = 2.5 0 -26.8837 0.96 4.6905 0.5494 -3.2385
ρ = 0.03 0 -5.4135 0.96 19.2187 0.3974 10.6434
ρ = 0.08 0 -13.5782 0.96 2.4528 0.5587 -1.9771
 = 0.1 0 -7.9930 0.96 11.3988 0.4488 4.0493
 = 0.3 0 -19.4932 0.96 3.2356 0.4739 -4.4447
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Similarly, the relative effectiveness of the two education subsidies (sd, sv varies with the
values of the model’s parameters. For instance, in the benchmark case, subsidizing physical
inputs education (sd) is more effective than subsidizing educational time (sv). However,
when β decreases to 0.2, the opposite is true. One surprising result in Table 1.6 is the
negative relationship between the R&D subsidy and the level of welfare, which is contrary to
conventional wisdom. 6.As shown in Table 1.2, although an increase in R&D subsidy raises
the growth rate (the positive growth effect on welfare), the higher subsidy (along with its
tax distortions) further misallocates capital and labor (the negative level effect on welfare).
In addition, it decreases the level of consumption much more than education subsidies. It
turns out that the negative level effect on welfare dominates the positive growth effect on
welfare (in particular, the loss from the decrease in consumption per intermediate good and
leisure dominates the gain from the increase in the growth rate), as a result, welfare falls as
the subsidy rises. We summarize the results as follows:
Result 2: The education subsidies are always more effective than the R&D subsidies in
improving welfare. However, the relative effectiveness of the two education subsidies varies
with the values of the model’s parameters.
We also consider the combinations of R&D subsidy and educational subsidies, e.g., a combi-
nation of R&D subsidies and physical input subsides as Figure 1.1. We show the combination
will not generate a higher welfare than the educational subsidies alone, since the R&D sub-
sidies have a negative effect on welfare.
6Under some values of parameters, the increase in R&D subsidies could improve welfare when the subsidies
rate is low enough, e.g., when α = 0.3, β = 0.5, γ = 0.35, η = 1, ρ = 0.05, A = 0.5, B = 0.325, σ = 1,  = 0.
However the ranking remains the same.
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In the previous section, we examine the growth and welfare effects of the subsidies by com-
paring the before- and after-subsidy steady states. In this section, we take into account the
transitional adjustments of the economy after a subsidy and a tax are implemented. We use
exactly the same set of parameter values as in the steady-state analysis and focus on the wel-
fare effects of the subsidies. To simulate the dynamics of the model, we rescale the variables
to convert the system of equilibrium equations into a stationary system of equations.
Let x = X/N , where X = N,H,K,C,D and Y , we convert the original equilibrium
system of equations ((12), (16), (52), (53), (54), (55), (56) and (57)) into the following
stationary equilibrium system:


















u(1− τh) + svv








σ − (1− σ)
]
×
σBu(1− τh) + svv1− τh − sv
[
d





1− β − 1
)
y
(1− sk)k − ρ
 ,
y = A(uh)α(1−γ)kαγ,
c = α2l(1− τh)(1− γ)y/(u(1 + τc)),
d =
β(1− τh − sv)(1− l − u)α2(1− γ)y
u(1− β)(1− sd) .
We then adopt the relaxation algorithm developed in Trimborn et al. (2005) to numeri-
cally solve the above system and compute the household’s welfare. Tables 1.7 and 1.8 report
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the steady-state values of the above re-scaled variables in a economy with and without sub-
sidies. Table 1.8 also gives the level of welfare in an equilibrium with each of the three
subsidies. We use one subsidy at a time, setting the rates at levels the lead to the same
amount of government expenditure in each case. We choose the government expenditure as
0.0054, and calculate the corresponding subsidy and tax rates according to equations (14)
and (69). Figures 1.2-1.4 show the transitional dynamics of the key variables associated with
each of the three subsidies while Figures 1.5-1.7 show the relationship between the subsidies
and the welfare level. Figure 1.8 compares the levels of welfare resulting from the three
expenditure-equivalent subsidies. We also perform various sensitivity analyses, the results
are not reported here but they are available upon request.
Table 1.7: Values of re-scaled variables in laissez-faire equilibrium.
h = 1.6013 u = 0.6395 l = 0.2511
c = 0.4543 d = 0.0396 y = 0.5562
Table 1.8: Welfare effect in terms of equalized government budget:0.0054.
Values of re-scaled variables
sη = 0.2 sd = 0.1119 sv = 0.108
h 1.2640 1.7619 1.8013
u 0.6372 0.6366 0.6245
l 0.2509 0.2491 0.2465
c 0.3708 0.4677 0.4727
d 0.033 0.482 0.044
y 0.4612 0.5832 0.5827
τ 0.0183 0.0144 0.0145
W -18.264 -12.945 -12.79
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Figure 1.1: Transition dynamics of re-scaled variables when R&D subsidies=0.2
  










































































































1.2 Transition dynamics of re-scale variables when R&D subsidies=0.2
1.3 Transition dynamics of re-scale variables when education subsidies=0.1119         
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Figure 1.3: Transition dynamics of re-scaled variables when time subsidies=0.108
  































































1.4 Transition dynamics of re-scale vari bles when time subsidies=0.108
1.5 Relationship of innovation subsidy and welfare from a dynamic analysis
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Figure 1.5: Relationship of education subsidy and welfare from a dynamic analysis
  
Figure 1.6: Relationship of time subsidy and welfare from a dynamic analysis































1.6 Relationship of education subsidy and welfare from a dynamic analysis
1.7 Relationship of time subsidy and welfare from a dynamic analysis
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Figure 1.7: Comparison of the effect on welfare of three subsidies in terms of 
equal government budget.





















1.8 Comparison of the effect on welfare
There are several interesting aspects regarding the differences between the steady-state and
dynamic behaviors of the economy. For R&D subsidies(Figure 1.2), starting with h = 1.601
(the steady-state value in an equilibrium without subsidies), the fractions of time used in
production (u) and leisure (l) jump to higher levels. That is, more time is used in production
and leisure and thus less time is spent on education. As a result, the values of c and d drop
to lower levels and the value of y jumps to a higher level (due to the rise in the amount
of labor used in production). The value of h falls, leading to a decrease in the values of y
and c. Then further adjustments in the economy lead to decreases in u and l and increase
in both time and physical investments in education. We could observe from Table 1.8, that
R&D subsidies is detrimental to human capital accumulation (h decreases) since it alloctes
more resouces from education to innovation (d decreases). The negative market size effect
(y decreases) may be detrimental to welfare.
For education subsidies (Figures 1.3 and 1.4), starting with h = 1.601, the two control
variables (u, l) drop to lower levels (i.e., less time is used in production and leisure and thus
more time is spent on education). At the same time, physical investment (d) in education
rises; The values of c and y fall to lower levels; The value of h rises, leading to to increases
in the values of y and c. Further adjustments in the economy result in increases in u and l
decreases in both time and physical investment in education.
Similar to the result in the steady-state analysis, we find that
Result 3: The education subsidies are always more effective than the R&D subsidies com-
paring the welfare at the welfare-maximizing subsidy rate. However, the relative effectiveness
of the two education subsidies depends on the values of the model’s parameters.
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7. Conclusion
How to promote R&D activity and education to enhance productivity growth is at the center
of public policy debates. This chapter contributes to the debate by comparing the growth
and welfare effects of two alternative measures to foster R&D-based growth. We develop a
dynamic general equilibrium growth model with both innovation and capital accumulation
to investigate the relative effectiveness of various government subsidies. The model is an
extension of the Romer (1990) model by incorporating human capital accumulation. In
particular, we assume that in addition to the time input, human capital accumulation also
requires physical inputs in order to consider the subsidy to physical investment in education.
In our model, the growth rate of output depends on household’s preferences, human capital
production technology and R&D activities and government policies affect the growth rate.
Even if the human capital accumulation do not requires physical inputs (when β = 0), the
growth also depends on both human capital production technology and R&D activities. This
is different from the results in Zeng (2003), in which as long as the human capital is the
only input in human capital accumulation, then the long-run growth rate does not depend on
R&D technology. The difference is mainly because of the introduction of elastic labor supply
in our model, i.e, the R&D subsidies not only affect the rate of return of the investment in
R&D but also time allocation. As in Romer (1990) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004,
Chapter 6), the laissez-faire equilibrium growth rate is less than optimal because of the
existence of the monopoly pricing of the intermediate goods and the positive externality
associated with innovation.
We consider both R&D and education subsidies and examine their relative effectiveness
in stimulating economic growth and improving welfare. We find that both the R&D and
education subsidies can raise the long-run growth rate and that the education subsidies are
always more effective than the R&D subsidies. However, the relative effectiveness of the two
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education subsidies depends on the values of the model’s parameters.
We also find from both steady-state and dynamic analysis that subsidizing education
improves welfare while subsidizing innovation does the opposite and that the welfare effects of
the two education subsides varies with the values of the model’s parameters. The result that
the R&D subsidies are welfare reducing is surprising at first glance. However, as discussed
in Section 4, the R&D subsidies have two offsetting effects on welfare (a negative level effect
and a positive growth effect). It turns out that the negative effect always more than offsets
the positive effect. As a result, the R&D subsidies always reduce welfare. Our results
are consistent with those in Volker grossmann (2004), in which they claimed, due to the
rivalry of education expenditure, effective aggregate supply of skilled labor may not increase
in response to higher R&D subsidies. While in our model, the R&D subsidies directly
decreases the physical input into human capital accumulation, which is weaken the human
capital accumulation, generating a negative market size effect.
Although both the R&D and education subsidies are commonly used in real world and
both can stimulate economic growth, this chapter concludes that subsidizing education is
more promising than subsidizing R&D in enhancing welfare. Sapir et al. (2004) recommend-
ed a substantial increase in government and EU spending for postgraduate education. Our
analysis has given a theoretical foundation to this policy prescription by showing that such
a policy will unambiguously boost efficiency and growth. Although in the real world, almost
a third of R&D expenditure in the OECD is financed by the government sector through
grants, funding or tax incentives, (OECD, 1999), as pointed out by Goolsbee (1998), when
the government increases R&D spending subsidies or direct provision, a significant fraction
of the increased spending goes directly into higher wages, an increase in the price rather than
the quantity of inventive activity in the long run. It is fair to say that R&D policy needs to
be re-evaluated.
The findings in this chapter suggest that governments should seriously consider their
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policy-mix of different subsidies to promote growth and welfare especially in the case of
tight government budgets. Although the finding is based on a closed economy, they may
also hold in a small open economy. The empirical study on Taiwan (a small open economy)
in Lin (2003) indirectly supports our findings. Lin (2003) examines the impact of education
and technical progress on economic growth in Taiwan over the period from 1965 to 2000 and
finds that education has a positive and significant effect on growth, but the role of technical
progress does not appear to be extraordinarily important. In a small economy, there will be
cross-country higher education externalities, which means not only there should be education
subsidies but also cooperate education project between countries. At the meantime, when
the bulk of technological advances occur as a result of R&D in other countries, there will be
even higher R&D externalities, so the results regarding that the R&D subsidies may decrease
welfare may change.
With the numerical example and sensitivity analysis, all the results are general in the
economy environment. However, if the same issue are examined in a total different model,
such as a growth model with overlapping generations, some results may still hold, but some
may change. The results in Chapter 2&3 also subject to this.
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Part II
Chapter 2: Optimal Taxation in an
R&D Growth Model with Variety
Expansion
1. Introduction
It is well known that in Chamley and Judd’s neoclassical growth model with capital
accumulation and infinitely-lived agents, the optimal tax system to finance an exogenous
government expenditure involves a zero tax rate on capital in the long run, with the required
tax revenue being collected by a distortional tax on labor income. Many studies based on
the Chamley-Judd model reconfirm this result. Judd (1999) claimed not only the tax on
physical capital but also the tax on human capital should be zero if human capital is not a
final good. Chamley (1986) also showed that optimal tax rate is zero in the long run in a
general equilibrium model.
However, Jones et al. (1993) studied the connection between government policies and
growth. They compared the capital and labor income tax in an AK model, and found that a
positive tax on capital income becomes optimal under special conditions. In addition, Jones
et al. (1997) extended the model to an economy with both physical and human capital, and
found that the zero optimal taxation on both capital incomes is due to three strict conditions:
constant return to scale, a sufficiently rich tax code, and no possibilities for relative prices
to affect wealth. They found a positive optimal tax on capital with inelastic labor supply
or restrictions on what taxes could be levied. Therefore, there are still rationales for also
taxing capital, in an economy with credit-constrained agents (e.g., Chamley(2001)), or with
private information (e.g., Golosov et al. (2006), Kocherlakota (2010)), or with two sources of
inequality (e.g., Piketty and Saez (2012)). Turnovsky (1996) suggested the trade off between
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consumption and income taxes should depend on the level of government expenditure relative
to its social optimum in an economy with public goods. In other aspect, Devereux & Love
(1994) compared the growth and welfare effects of capital income and wage taxes and claimed
that firstly for equal percentage changes, the wage tax has a larger effect on growth than
the capital tax, but for revenue-equivalent changes, they have similar effects on growth.
Secondly, the capital income tax will generate a higher welfare cost than wage tax.
More recently, some attention has been paid to the effects of taxation in innovation-
based growth model. Atkeson and Burstein (2012) compared R&D tax credits, federal
expenditures on R&D, and corporate profit tax in a semi-endogenous growth model with
horizontal innovation, focusing on the impact of these policies on innovation and welfare.
More closely related to our analysis is the paper by Aghion et al. (2013), in which optimal
taxation was discussed in a Schumpeterian growth model. Their results showed that a zero
tax on capital becomes suboptimal for a given required trend of public expenditure due
to a market size effect and claimed that Chamley-Judd result is not robust to introducing
endogenous technical progress.
This study, parallel to Aghion et al. (2013), aims at examining the robustness of the
results in Chamley-Judd by introducing endogenous technical progress. We imply an R&D
growth model with variety expansion. More specifically, in Section 2, we firstly introduce a
basic model without human capital accumulation, where final good is produced with inter-
mediate good and labor, and intermediate good is produced with only physical capital. We
show that the optimal tax on physical capital is always negative and there is an negative re-
lationship between the tax on physical capital and the steady-state growth rate given a fixed
government expenditure share. The first main difference between our study and Aghion et
al. (2013) is that economic growth in our model is driven by horizontal innovation through
variety expansion instead of vertical innovation through quality improvement. It is shown in
Aghion and Howitt (1992) that there can be too much or too little R&D investment in a ver-
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tical innovation model. However, R&D is always under-invested in variety expansion model
due to the monopoly inefficiency and knowledge spillover. Thus, with the non-accumulable
labor income tax distortion, it is always optimal to tax labor while subsidizing physical
capital accumulation.
The second difference is that we also introduce an extended model with human capital
accumulation in Section 4 to make the model more general, we show that, in this extended
model, it is optimal to tax physical capital to subsidize human capital accumulation as
long as the government expenditure share is low enough. We claim that the difference in
optimal taxation in the two models mainly comes from the fact that human capital can be
accumulated and plays a more important role (relative to physical capital) in the monopolized
production sector in the extended model. Lastly, we also apply dynamic analysis to find the
respective tax distortion, and it clearly shows that the physical capital income tax distortion
decreases the welfare more than labor income tax distortion in the model without human
capital, while in an economy with human capital accumulation, the ranking reverses.
The remaining part of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic
model and characterizes the dynamic system of the equilibrium. Section 3 analyzes optimal
taxation in steady-state. Section 4 extends the analysis to a model with human capital.
Section 5 concludes.
2. Basic Model
The basic model is due to Romer (1990). We will firstly use a model without human capital
and then extend the model by incorporating human capital accumulation in section 4. We
describe the details of the economic environment in the following sub-sections.
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2.1 Technologies
There are four types of production activities in the economy: final good production, inter-
mediate good production, innovation, and physical capital accumulation. It is assumed that
there exists monopoly power in the intermediate good sector while all the other sectors are
perfectly competitive.
2.1.1 Final good production
A final good producer uses a continuum of intermediates goods and labor as its inputs subject







αdi, A > 0, 0 < α < 1, (71)
where the subscript t refers to time; A is a productivity parameter; α measures the con-
tribution of an intermediate good to the final good production and inversely measures the
intermediate monopolist’s market power; Yt is the final output; zit is the flow of intermediate
good i; Nt is the number of intermediate goods; Lt is the labor used in final good production.
For simplicity, we omit the time subscript t throughout the chapter whenever no confusion









where we normalize the price of final good to 1 and pi is the price of intermediate good i in
terms of the final good. Profit maximization in the competitive final good sector gives the











That is, in the competitive final good sector, the price of an input should equal to its marginal
product.
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2.1.2 Intermediate good production
Each monopoly intermediate producer i who has a patented technology for one variety uses
physical capital ki to produce an intermediate good according to
zi = ki. (74)
Given the interest rate r, and the final good sector’s demand for intermediate good i given
by equation (2), intermediate good i producer chooses the amount of capital to maximize
its profit
pii = pizi − rki.
The solution to this maximization problem gives the producer’s demand function for
capital ki as well as the output zi.






, i ∈ [0, N ] (75)
by which we obtain






















Denoting Π = Npi, we have Π/Y = α(1−α), that is, the aggregate profit is proportional
to the aggregate output, which accords with the result in Aghion et al. (2013). In addition,
the model is symmetric so that each new intermediate good raises N by one unit. Also, each
unit of capital here is one infinitely durable unit of the final good, and r is the rental rate for
each such unit, making it the interest rate that expresses the relative prices of final goods
today and in the future.
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2.1.3 Innovation
The R&D sector is perfectly competitive and the innovation process is deterministic. An
innovator invests η units of final good to discover a technology to produce a new intermediate
good. The innovator then becomes the sole producer of the intermediate good forever. The
value of a new technology equals the present value of the profits from producing the new












Assuming free entry in the R&D sector, we have
V = η. (78)
From equation (77), we obtain
V˙ = pi − rV, (79)
where a dot on the top of a variable represents the time change rate of that variable. Com-





which holds true both in and outside the steady state.
2.2 Households
The model economy is populated by a continuum of identical infinitely-lived households
with measure one. The representative household is endowed with 1 unit of time which
is inelastically allocated between final good production u, and leisure l (= 1 − u). The





1− σ exp(−ρt)dt, (81)
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where C is consumption; ρ is the constant rate of time preference; σ is the elasticity of
marginal utility; ε is the elasticity of the flow of utility with respect to leisure; l is the
amount of time allocated into leisure. The representative household has a budget constraint
C = (1− τk)rK + (1− τl)wu− K˙ +D, (82)
where two taxes are introduced to illustrate the problem of optimal taxation: one on physical
capital income at rate τk and the other on labor income at rate τl and D
7is the total dividend
from intermediate producers.
The representative household chooses consumption C, and the time allocation to maxi-
mize its life-time utility equation (81), subject to the budget constraint equation (82). The
current-value Hamiltonian function for this optimization problem is
L = [C(1− u)
ε]1−σ − 1
1− σ + λ [(1− τk)rK + (1− τl)wu+D − C] ,
where λ is the costate variable associated with equation (82). The first-order conditions for
this optimization problem are equation (82) and the following equations,
C : C−σ(1− u)(1−σ) = λ, (83)
u : C1−σ(1− u)(1−σ)−1 = λ(1− τl)w, (84)
K : λr(1− τk) = −λ˙+ ρλ, (85)
TV C : lim
t→∞ e
−ρtλtKtdt = 0. (86)
Equation (83) (respectively, (84)) equalizes the marginal benefit and marginal cost of con-
sumption (respectively, time allocated into production). Equation (85) is the optimal dy-
namic condition for physical capital accumulation and equation (86) is the transversalty
condition.
7Although in real world tax laws, capital income and dividends are taxed at the same rate, the monopoly
profits in the intermediate goods sector are treated differently from the income from renting out capital
goods. If the dividends were taxed at the same rate as capital income, this increases the capital income tax
distortion and will may change the ranking of the two taxes.
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2.3 Government
We assume that the government’s budget is balanced at each point in time. At the meantime,
same as Aghion et al. (2013), we assume the government has an exogenous government
expenditure, whose share of final output is fixed at x, i.e. G = xY . Both taxes on capital
and labor income are collected to finance the exogenous government expenditure. Thus, we
have 8
τkrK + τlwu = G, (87)
where the left-hand side is the sum of tax revenue collected from capital and labor income
and the right-hand side is the government expenditure which is proportional to final output.
2.4 Decentralized equilibrium
We now derive the equilibrium condition. According to equation (75), all the intermediate
good producers will produce the same quantity, so we have zi = z = K/N , since from the




0 zidi = K. From the labor market
clearing conditions, i.e., u = L. We could rewrite Y as
Y = AKα(uN)1−α. (88)
Also the final good (Y ) market clearing condition will be satisfied,
Y = C + K˙ + ηN˙ +G, (89)
i,e, final output will be distributed among consumption, investment, innovation as well as
government expenditure. We now begin to derive the equilibrium conditions for each of these
components. We first derive the expression for consumption. From equations (83) and (84),
we have the relationship between C and u, which is
C = (1− u)(1− τl)w/. (90)
8In our analysis, either tax rates can be negative. Thus, it is possible to use only one tax to finance both
the government expenditure and a subsidy.
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Substituting equation (73) into equation (90), we have
C = (1− u)(1− τl)(1− α)Y/(u). (91)
This expression implies that consumption in equilibrium is always proportional to final out-
put. At the meantime, its share to final output depends negatively on the amount of time
devoted into production, the tax on labor income as well as the elasticity of the flow of utility




≡ k = αη
1− α, (92)







Some observations are worth noting based on the fact that capital to productivity in terms of
N (k) is constant. Firstly, since we could rewrite Y
N
≡ y = Au1−αkα, y will depend positively
on labor supply (u) as k is constant. Policies which could increase time allocated into pro-
duction will always have a positive market size effect. 10 Also from the subsection describing
intermediate goods production, we know that the aggregate profit (Π) is proportional to
the aggregate final output (Y ), thus the profit to productivity (pi) is also proportional to
the final output to productivity (y). In addition, pi
r
= η holds true both in and outside the
steady state. Thus, because of the positive relationship between the final output to produc-
tivity (y) and the labor supply (u), we also have a positive relationship between the profit
to productivity (pi) and the labor supply (u) and between the interest rate (r) and the labor
supply (u) as well. Combining the final good market clearing condition equation (89) and
9Please see details in footnote 3 in Chapter 1
10The definition of market size effect is the same as in Aghion et al. (2013)
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equation (93), we have the transition dynamics for the measure of intermediate goods N and
physical capital K,
N˙ =




[(1− x)Y − C]K
K +Nη
. (95)
In addition, from equation (75), we have
r = α2AN1−αKα−1(u)1−α,
which implies that the interest rate will be lower than the marginal product of capital,
highlighting the important implication in variety-expansion models. Using equations (83)
and (85), we have
−σC˙
C




= ρ− r(1− τk),
by which we obtain
u˙ =
(1− u)u{ρ+ σ [(1−x)Y−C]
K+Nη
− α2AN1−αKα−1(u)1−α(1− τk)}
ασ(1− u) + [(σ − 1) + σ]u . (96)
The dynamics of the decentralized economy are then characterized by the system of equations
(88), (91), (94), (95) and (96), along with an initial condition (K0, N0) and the transversally
condition equation (86). We construct a stationary system by re-scaling the variables to
variable to productivity. Letting s = S/N , where S = N,K,C and Y , (We always have
n = 1, and k = αη
1−α which are constant), we convert the original equilibrium system of
equations (88), (91), (94), (95) and (96) into the following stationary equilibrium system:
u˙ =
(1− u)u{ρ+ σ [(1−x)y−c]
k+η
− α2Akα−1u1−α(1− τk)}
ασ(1− u) + [(σ − 1) + σ]u , (97)
y = Au1−αkα, (98)
c = (1− u)(1− τl)(1− α)Au−αkα/. (99)
Since the expressions for y and c are just static equations and we already know the values
of n and k, the key variable in the above system is labor supply (u).
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3. Balanced growth equilibrium
In the balanced growth equilibrium, the time allocation (u, l) remains the same and all the
other variables (consumption C, the number of intermediate good N , physical capital stock
K, and final output Y ) grow at the same constant rate g, that is, u˙ = 0 and S˙/S = g, where
S = C,N,K and Y . We now derive the steady-state equilibrium conditions that determine
the decentralized economy growth rate (g) and time allocation. Setting u˙ = 0, we obtain
ρ+ σ
[(1− x)y − c]
k + η
− α2Akα−1(1− τk)u1−α = 0. (100)
Since N˙/N = (1−x)y−c
k+η
= g, from equation (100), we have
















Dividing both sides of the final good market clearing condition equation (89) by Y , we





















From equations (76) and (78), we have
y =
η(σg + ρ)
α(1− α)(1− τk) ,






















In addition, the government expenditure is a fixed share of final output, i.e., G
Y
= x.
In summary we could re-write the final output clearing condition as
α(1− τk)g
σg + ρ
= 1− x− ζc. (102)
Equation (102) determines the steady-state growth rate in the decentralized equilibrium.
50
3.1 Existence of the balanced growth equilibrium
For simplicity, we consider a laissez faire equilibrium to show the existence of the decentral-
ized equilibrium, then if τk and τl are sufficiently small, by the continuity of the equations, the
equilibrium should exist as well. When there is no government intervention, we could re-write






1−α , thus there is a one-to-one relationship between the
labor supply u and the growth rate g. As a result, it is enough to use the equation involving
u to prove the existence, uniqueness and stability of the equilibrium. Looking back into the
stationary equilibrium system equations (97) to (99), setting u˙ = 0, when x = τk = τl = 0














We denote the value of u that solves the above equation as u∗. We now derive the existence
condition of the balanced growth equilibrium and then examine the stability of the system.




1−α+ , and since u+ l = 1, we should have u < 1. In summary, we have
1−α
1−α+ < u < 1.
Proposition 1: There always exists a positive unique value of u∗ such that 1−α
1−α+ < u
∗ < 1,






Proof. We will prove the proposition by intermediate value theorem. Firstly, it is obvi-
ous that the LHS of equation (103) is increasing in u. In addition, when u = 1, we have
LHS = ρ + Aα(1−α
αη
)1−α(σ − α) > 0, as long as σ > 1.11 Lastly, when u = 1−α
1−α+ , we have





< 0, as long as condition (ii) holds. Q.E.D.
11The value of σ is just a sufficient condition for the existence of an unique positive value of u∗. To be
more precise, as long as σ > α − ρ
αA( 1−ααη )
1−α , the statement is true. In addition, in most empirical studies,
the value of the elasticity of marginal utility (σ) is found to be greater 1.
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These conditions can be guaranteed by various sufficient conditions concerning the values
of the preferences such as a sufficiently low subjective discount rate (low value of ρ), and a
sufficiently high elasticity of marginal utility (high value of σ).
Lastly, under the conditions of the existence of the balanced growth equilibrium: σ > 1,
since the LHS of equation (103) is increasing in u, we know from equation (97) that when
u > u∗, u˙ > 0, and when u < u∗, u˙ < 0, thus the dynamic system is globally unstable. So
the economy must jump to the steady state. Thus in the basic model, we will focus only on
balanced growth analysis. And we will perform dynamic analysis in an extended model in
section 4.
3.2 Government’s problem
The government will choose τk and τl to maximize the representative consumer’s life time
utility equation (81), such that the optimal choice for representative consumer: equation
(102) and the government budget constraint equation (87) are satisfied. We plug the values
of r, k, w and u to reduce equation (87) to,
x = α2τk + τl(1− α), (104)
from which we could express τl in terms of τk and x,
τl =
x− α2τk
1− α . (105)
Equation (105) implies that for any given government expenditure share x, 1% increase
in physical capital income tax will decrease the labor income tax by α
2
1−α%. The govern-
ment then needs to find an optimal combination of the two taxes in terms of improving
growth/welfare. In addition, since both rates should be less than 1, we have x+α−1
α2
< τk < 1.






. Plugging equation (105) back into equation (102), we could
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rewrite equation (102) as
g =
(1− x− ζc)(σg + ρ)
α(1− τk) , (106)
where
ζc =
(1− u)(1− α− x+ α2τk)
u
.
Thus, the steady-state growth rate will be determined by the values of x, τk and other
parameters. We graph both the LHS and the RHS of equation (106) in Figure 2.1 for the
proof in Proposition 2, noticing that both the LHS and the RHS are increasing functions
with g.
Proposition 2: Given any given x, we have ∂g
∂τk
< 0, as long as σ > 1.
The steady-state growth rate will be determined by the intersection of the LHS and the
RHS cruves. Since, the LHS curve will not be affected by the value of τk, we only need
to show that there should be a left-ward moving of the RHS curve given a higher rate of
physical capital income tax τk.














)1−α − ρ]. Meanwhile at both
(τ1, g1) and (τ2, g2), the RHS of equation (106) equals to the same value (1−x)αA(1−ααη )1−α. 2.
From u1 =
1−α−x+α2τ1
1−α−x+α2τ1+(1−x) and u2 =
1−α−x+α2τ2
1−α−x+α2τ2+(1−x) (the minimum value of labor supply
to ensure that consumption does not exceed the total final output net of government expendi-























, and at (τ1, g1) and (τ2, g2), the RHS of equation (106) equals
to 0.














Since y = (σg+ρ)η
α(1−α)(1−τk) , we could write the growth rate as g = b˜1y(1 − τk) + b˜2, where
b˜1 and b˜2 are constants. An increase in τk has two growth effects: (i) market size effect
(y), and (ii) innovation incentive effect (1 − τk). Arising from the main characteristics
of the variety-expansion model: the monopoly power in the intermediate good sector and
technology spillover, the decentralized economy has both a lower level of production as well
as a lower growth rate in the steady state. Firstly, an increase in τk will reduce incentive for
physical capital investment which will in turn decrease the steady-state growth rate, which
is a negative innovation incentive effect ((1−τk) decreases). However, on the other hand, the
corresponding decrease in τl will increase people’s incentive to devote time into production,
which will increase the growth rate, due to the positive market size effect (y increases as u
increases). The positive effect through labor is limited, because the maximum amount of
time used in production is limited, while the negative effect through physical capital could
accumulate, the negative effect will always more than offset the positive effect, resulting in
a negative relationship between the growth rate and the tax on physical capital income.
Our results accord with those widely accepted studies which claimed that there should be
a negative relationship between taxation and growth (Barro (1990, 1991), Gordon and Lee
(2006)). However, they are different from Aghion et al. (2013) in which the relationship
between the growth rate and the tax on physical capital income is not always negative. The
differences arise from the fact that intermediate goods are monopolized. Aghion et al. (2013)
examined the optimal taxation problem in a Schumpeterian growth model, in which R&D
could be over-invested or under-invested by monopoly power, while in our model with variety
expansion, the R&D will always be under-invested, thus, it will be optimal to subsidize the
physical capital which is the only input in intermediate goods sector.
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3.3 Numerical results
Next we perform numerical simulations for the model. The parameter values we require are
preference parameters (, σ, ρ), and technology parameters (α,A, η). We first pin down a
bench mark economy by choosing the values of the parameters, and then examine growth
and welfare effects of the taxes in the decentralized economy.
First we choose the values of the time preference ρ to be 0.05 and contribution of an
intermediate good α = 0.3 (implying a conventional labor’s share of 0.7) based on the growth
calibration exercises in Lucas (1990), King and Rebelo (1990), and Stokey and Rebelo (1995).
We follow Zeng and Zhang (2007) to set the elasticity of marginal utility σ to be 1.5.
Following Prescott (1986), we choose, the elasticity of labor supply ε, to be 0.5, leading to
the representative agent spends about 60 per cent of his available time working. The last two
parameters, final good productivity A and innovation cost η (A = 1, η = 1.3, g = 0.0304) are
chose to generate a growth rate of about 3.0% (the average growth rate in the United States
for the last 30 years.) All values of the parameters meet the requirements in Proposition 1.
Table 2.1 and Figure 2.2 report the optimal tax rates (τk and τl ) for various government
expenditure shares.12
12We consider the range of x between 0% to 50%, since based on the observation, total United States
government expenditure’s share on GDP raised from 8% in 1929 to around 37% in 2011. We believe the
range we choose for the value of x reflects the reality.
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2.2 Optimal tax on physical capital benchmark
Table 2.1: Optimal taxes for various government expenditure shares












Observations are summarized in Result 1.
Result 1: The optimal tax on capital is always negative. In addition, the optimal tax on
capital will increase with the share of government expenditure.
In a variety expansion growth model, the optimal tax on capital is always negative, which
is financed by a positive tax on labor income (which also finances the government expendi-
ture). The basic trend of Figure 2.2 is the same as the Figure 1 in Aghion et al. (2013).
However when the government expenditure’s share on the final output is large enough, they
claim a positive optimal capital tax rate which is in contrast with the negative optimal capital
tax rate in our model. The reason is that in variety-expansion models, innovation activities
are always under-invested. But in the quality-ladder models, the innovation activities could
be under-invested or over-invested.
At the meantime, as the government expenditure share x increases, the optimal tax on
capital gradually increases (the subsidy on capital gradually decreases). Since the tax on
labor must grow with the increase in the size of government expenditure, so does the tax
distortion. Thus, we need to reduce the subsidy to capital to offset this negative impact. In
the above analysis, the distortion of labor income tax is limited and will not accumulate,
however, if there is human capital accumulation (instead of labor) which will accumulate,
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the results concerning the optimal tax on capital may change. The optimal tax problem in
an extended model is the main objective of the next section.
4. Extension: Model with human capital
This section extends the model to an economy with human capital accumulation. There are
several differences between the two models, as discussed in details in the following subsec-
tions.
4.1 Technologies
4.1.1 Final good production
A final good producer only uses a continuum of intermediate goods and a fixed factor as its
inputs subject to the following Cobb-Douglas production function, we eliminates labor as a
factor in final goods production.




αdi, A > 0, 0 < α < 1,
where F is the quantity of the fixed factor. For simplicity, we normalize the quantity of






αdi, A > 0, 0 < α < 1.
4.1.2 Intermediate good production
In addition, each intermediate monopolist i uses both physical (ki) and human capital (mi)





i , 0 < γ < 1, (107)
where γ measures the contribution of physical capital to the intermediate good production.
Each intermediate good producer chooses the amounts of physical and human capital to
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maximize its profit, given the wage rate (w) and interest rate (r).
pii = pizi − wmi − rki.
The solution to the maximization problem gives the demand functions for ki and mi. Sim-
ilarly we find that all the intermediate good producers will produce the same quantity, so
we have zi = z and pii = pi. Re-writing Y = AN





















Thus, in the extended model, the aggregate profit Npi is still proportional to the aggregate
final output Y , which is exactly the same as in the basic model.
4.1.3 Innovation
The behavior of an R&D firm is the same as in the model without human capital. As a
result, we have V = pi
r
= η holds true both in and outside the steady state.
4.2 Households
The representative household is endowed with 1 unit of time which is inelastically allocated
among intermediate good production u, human capital accumulation v and leisure l (=
1− u− v). The household has the same utility function, as in equation (81).
The household accumulates human capital H according to
H˙ = BvH, (112)
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where B is a productivity parameter and v is time input in education.
The representative household has the following budget constraint
C = (1− τk)rK + (1− τh)wuH − K˙ +D + PF , (113)
where τk and τh are now taxes on physical capital income and human capital income. And
PF is the fixed factor (F ) income, which equals to (1− α)Y .
The representative household chooses consumption C, the time allocation u and l to
maximize its life-time utility, subject to the human capital accumulation technology and the
budget constraint. The current-value Hamiltonian function for this optimization problem is
L = (Cl
ε)1−σ − 1
1− σ + λ1B[(1− u− l)H]
+λ2[(1− τk)rK + (1− τh)wuH − C +D + PF ], (114)
where λ1t and λ2t are respectively the costate variables associated with equations (112) and
(113). The first-order conditions for this optimization problem are equations (112), (113)
and the following conditions
C : C−σl(1−σ) = λ2, (115)
l : C1−σl
(1−σ)−1 = λ1BH, (116)
u : λ1BH = λ2[(1− τh)wH], (117)
H : λ1B(1− u− l) + λ2(1− τh)wu = −λ˙1 + ρλ1, (118)
K : λ2r(1− τk) = −λ˙2 + ρλ2, (119)
TV CH : lim
t→∞ e
−ρtλ1tHt = 0, (120)
TV CK : lim
t→∞ e
−ρtλ2tKt = 0, (121)
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where λ1t,λ2t are the costate variables. Equation (115) (respectively (116),(117)) equalizes
the marginal benefit and marginal cost of consumption (respectively time allocated to leisure,
time allocated to production). Equations (119) and (121) (respectively (118), (120)) are the
optimal dynamic conditions for physical capital (respectively, human capital) accumulation.
4.3 Decentralized equilibrium
We now derive the equilibrium conditions. Using the physical and human capital mar-
ket clearing conditions, i.e.,
∫N
0 kidi = Nk = K and
∫N
0 midi = Nm = uH, we have
k = K/N , m = uH/N and z = Kγ(uH)1−γ/N . Thus Y could be expressed as Y =
AN1−αKαγ(uH)α(1−γ). As usual, there is final good clearing condition,
Y = C + K˙ + ηN˙ +G, (122)
which is the same as in the basic model. From equations (115) and (116), we can easily get
the relationship between C and l,
C = l(1− τh)wH/. (123)
Similar to the model without human capital, we combine pi
r
= η and equation (111) to
obtain k = αγη
1−α , which is constant.




. Using this condition, along
with the final good market clearing condition, we have
N˙ =




[(1− x)Y − C]K
K +Nη
. (125)
From physical and human capital markets clearing conditions, we obtain
r = α2γAN1−α(uH)α(1−γ)Kαγ−1,
13Refer to the details in footnote 3
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and
w = α2(1− γ)AN1−α(uH)(α(1−γ)−1)Kαγ. (126)
Thus, not only the interest rate is less than the marginal product of physical capital, but
also the wage rate is less than the marginal product of human capital. Thus, there is less
than optimal demand for both physical capital and human capital. In addition, we observe
that rK = α2γY , and wuH = α2(1 − γ)Y , i.e. because of the existence of monopoly, the
sum of three factors income rK + wuH + PF = (1 − α + α2)Y does not equal to Y . The
remaining α(1 − α)Y is the monopoly profit. Plugging the value of w into equation (123),
we have
C = α2l(1− τh)(1− γ)Y/(u). (127)
Obviously, consumption is again proportional to output. The ratio of consumption to output
depends negatively on the amount of time allocated into production, and the tax rate on
human capital income and positively on the amount of time allocated into leisure.














+B [u+ α(1− γ)(1− u− l)]} , (128)
l˙ =
l
σ − (1− σ)
[
σBu− ρ− α2γY/K(σ − 1)(1− τk)
]
. (129)
The dynamics of the decentralized economy are then characterized by the system of
equations (112), (122), (124), (125), (127),(128) and (129), along with an initial condition
(H0, K0, N0) and the transversally conditions equations (120) and (121).
4.3.1 Steady state analysis
We will first focus on the steady-state balanced growth equilibrium, where the number of
intermediate goods N , human capital H and physical capital K, consumption C, and final
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output Y will grow at the same rate g. While time allocation (l and u) and factor prices (r
and w) will remain constant. We could reduce the system to two equations describing the
balanced growth path. Since H˙
H
= g, from equation (112), we have g = Bv = B(1− u− l).




= g, setting l˙ = u˙ = 0, we have




1− τk . (131)
Equation (130) is the first equation from the condition: in steady state all sectors will
have the same rate of return. Next re-writing rK = α2γY and recalling k = αγη
1−α , we have
y =
(σg + ρ)η
α(1− α)(1− τk) . (132)
This expression is the same as in the basic model. Equation (132) implies that a capital
income tax has two effects on the growth rate as well, i.e., a market effect and an innovation








Thus, dividing both sides of the final good market clearing condition by Y , we have
α(αγ + 1− α)(1− τk) g
σg + ρ
= 1− x− ζc. (134)
Equation (134) is the second equation from the final good clearing condition.
Equations (130) and (134) will determine growth rate g and leisure l in steady state in
decentralized economy. Combining equations (130) and (134), we obtain
α(αγ + 1− α)(1− τk) g
σg + ρ
= 1− x− ζc, (135)
where
ζc =
α2(1− γ)(1− τh)[B − (σg + ρ)]
ε[(σ − 1)g + ρ] .
Equation (135) determines the steady-state growth rate g.
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4.4 Existence of the equilibrium
The existence and uniqueness of the steady-state equilibrium are given by
Proposition 3: If (i) B > ρ[1 + ε(1−x)
α2(1−γ)(1−τh) ] and (ii) σ > 1 then there always exists a
unique positive growth rate.
Proof. We will use Figure 2.3 for the curves of both LHS and RHS of equation (135) to
show the existence of an positive growth rate. Firstly, both LHS and RHS are positive
monotonic functions with g. When g = g, we have ζc = 1−x, thus RHS = 0 < LHS, where
g = α
2(1−γ)(B−ρ)(1−τh)−(1−x)ρ
(1−x)(σ−1)+α2(1−γ)(1−τh)σ . When g = g =
B−ρ
σ
, we have ζc = 0. Moreover, we have g > 0
as long as the B > ρ[1+ ε(1−x)
α2(1−γ)(1−τh) ] holds, and RHS = 1 > LHS = α(αγ+1−α)(1−τk)
B−ρ
Bσ
as long as condition (ii) holds. Q.E.D.
Condition (i) in this proposition is equivalent to the condition that V > η. Consider
the economy in a steady state with no growth (g = 0). When g = 0, we have v = 0,
l = (1−x)ε
α2(1−γ)(1−τh)+(1−x)ε , u =
α2(1−γ)(1−τh)
α2(1−γ)(1−τh)+(1−x)ε , r =
ρ















Then the condition V > η leads to B > ρ[1+ ε(1−x)
α2(1−γ)(1−τh) ]. Since the marginal private benefit
of investing in R&D is greater than its marginal cost, it is optimal for the profit-maximizing




                                           g
2.3 Steady state growth rate in the extended model
LHS,RHS
This condition can be guaranteed by various sufficient conditions concerning the values of
the technology and preferences such as a sufficiently low subjective discount rate (low value
of ρ), a sufficiently productive human capital accumulation technology (high value of B), a
sufficiently high elasticity of marginal utility and a sufficiently low elasticity of the flow of
utility with respect to leisure (low value of ε).14(high value of σ)
4.5 Government’s problem
The government will now choose τk and τh to maximize the life-time utility for the represen-
tative consumer equation (81), such that the optimal conditions equations (130) and (134)
and the following government’s balanced budget condition are satisfied,
τkrK + τhwuH = G = xY,
where the left-hand side is the sum of tax revenue from physical capital and human capital
income, and the right-hand side is the government expenditure. Since rK = α2γY , and
wuH = α2(1− γ)Y , the above equation could be reduced to
x = α2τkγ + α
2τh(1− γ). (136)
In order to make consumption (C) positive, we should have x−α
2(1−γ)
α2γ
< τk. Also, we
should have τk < 1. To compare the results in the extended model with those in the basic
model, we consider the cases with x < α2(1− γ). 15
4.6 Effects of taxation
To examine the impact of taxation on the economy, we first use the government’s budget
constraint equation (136)) to express τh as a function of x and τk and then rewrite the
14This elasticity is referred to as the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
15The basic model, the optimal capital income tax is negative. When x > α2(1− γ), τk has to be positive
since τh ≤ 1. Such values of parameters will give us an ambiguous comparison of the sign of optimal physical
capital tax. Thus, we rule out such combinations of parameters.
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equilibrium condition equation (135) as,
α(αγ + 1− α)(1− τk) g
σg + ρ
= 1− x− (α
2(1− γ)− x+ α2γτk)[B − (σg + ρ)]
ε[(σ − 1)g + ρ] . (137)
We need to firstly find the valid range of τk. In order to satisfy the condition for existence of a
unique positive growth rate as in Proposition 3, we need B > ρ[1+ (1−x)ε













< τk < 1.
4.6.1 Effect on growth
We start to examine the gross effect of taxation on growth rate. To see the effect of taxation








From equation (138), we use explicit differentiation to see the relationship of τk and g by
getting the first order partial differentiation of equation (138) with respect to the both

















(1− τk)[α2(1− γ)− x+ α2γτk] . (139)




[α2(1− γ)− x+ α2γτk] [(σ − 1)B + ρ]
(1− τk) [(σ − 1)g + ρ]2
− α(αγ + 1− α)ρ
(σg + ρ)2
. (140)
We will now examine the growth effects using the two equations, reported in Proposition 4-6
as follows.
Proposition 4: Within the valid range of τk, there does not exist an interior growth-









, if there is an interior solution, we will have ∂G
∂τk
= 0. From
equations (137) and (139), we could not find a value of τk such that
∂G
∂τk






< τ k). Q.E.D.





, we have the following propositions:
Proposition 5: If σ > σ , then an increase in the tax rate on physical capital will increase
the growth rate; when the value of τk increases and approaches 1, the growth rate will increase
and converge to g∗ = (B−ρ)(α
2−x)−(1−x)ρ
σ(α2−x)+(1−x)(σ−1) .
Proof. Since we have already shown that there is no interior solution, it is sufficient to show
that dg
dτk








[(B−ρ)(α2−x)−(1−x)ρ](αγ+1−α) ≡ Φ. If τk = τ k, we have (a) ∂G∂g = αρ(αγ+1−α)(1−Φ)Φ[(σ−1)g+ρ]2 > 0; (b)
∂G
∂τk
< 0, if σ > σ holds. Thus dg
dτk
> 0. Q.E.D.
Proposition 6: If σ < σ , then an increase in the tax rate on physical capital will decrease
the growth rate, thus maximum growth rate g∗ happens at τ k, and g∗ =
Φρ
1−σΦ .
Proof. The proof is parallel to that of Proposition 6. Q.E.D.
4.6.2 Effect on human capital
Next we will decompose the gross effect to examine the effect of taxation on human cap-
ital supply (“the market size effect”). In the extended model, the human capital stock





)α(1−γ) and y = Y
N
= Akαγmα(1−γ). Since k has been shown to be constan-
t, output to productivity y depends positively on human capital supply m which is the
market size effect. In addition, since V = pi
r
= η holds true as well both in and outside
69
the steady state and the profit to productivity (pi) is proportional to the final output to
productivity (y) by equation (111), we have a positive relationship not only between the
human capital supply m and y but also between m and pi and m and r.
Proposition 7: If σ > 1 , then an increase in the tax rate on physical capital will increase
human capital supply, the final output to productivity as well as the gross interest rate.
Proof. We have shown that there is a positive relationship between m and τk if and only if
there is a positive relationship between r and τk. So we only need to prove that r =
σg+ρ
1−τk
will increase with τk, from which we have g =
r(1−τk)−ρ
σ
. We could re-write equation (137) as
1− x+ α(αγ + 1− α)ρ
σr
=
σ(α2(1− γ)− x+ α2γτk)[B − r(1− τk)]
ε[(σ − 1)r(1− τk) + ρ]
+
α(αγ + 1− α)(1− τk)
σ
.
Both the LHS and the RHS will decrease with r and the LHS does not depend on τk, so we






α2σγ[B − r(1− τk)]
[(σ − 1)r(1− τk) + ρ] +
σ(α2(1− γ)− x+ α2γτk)r[ρ+ (σ − 1)B]
[(σ − 1)r(1− τk) + ρ]2
−α(αγ + 1− α)
σ
If Proposition 5 holds true, i.e. dg
dτk
> 0, then it is obvious that r = σg+ρ
1−τk will increase with
τk. If Proposition 6 applies, i.e.,
dg
dτk
< 0, then we have ∂RHS
∂τk
> 0, because α
2σγ[B−r(1−τk)]
[(σ−1)r(1−τk)+ρ] ,
which decreases with g will be greater than α(αγ+1−α)
σ
at g∗ = Φρ
1−σΦ , which is the maximum
value of g. Q.E.D.
Intuitively, the increase in the tax rate on physical capital will decrease the tax rate on
human capital given any required government budget. Thus, the consumer has incentive to
supply more human capital into production. Thus, the tax on physical capital always has
a positive market size effect on the growth rate. In summary the net sign of the effect of
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physical capital income taxation on growth depends on the value of the elasticity of marginal
utility (σ). 16 Thus, for a high (low) enough value of σ, the tax on physical capital income
will increase (decrease) growth. This is because for σ > 1 in CRRA utility function, with a
higher value of σ, the tax will provoke a stronger positive effect on employment and on the
gross interest rate, which is a stronger positive market size effect on growth.
The tax on physical capital has two opposite effects on the growth: the market size effect
which has been shown to be positive, that is, physical capital income tax will increase the
human capital supply and thus increase the total market size to promote growth and the
negative innovation incentive effect, leading to a lower growth rate. Their relative magnitude
determines the sign of the growth effect. Propositions 6 and 7 imply that the sign mainly
depends on several important parameters: the elasticity of marginal utility (σ), capital share
(γ) and labor supply elasticity (). Firstly, the elasticity of marginal utility (σ) will enforce
the positive market size effect, as a result of which, physical capital taxation is more effective
than human capital taxation in promoting growth with a high value of σ. Also, from equation
(136), we have already shown that, a 1% increase in physical capital tax will decrease the
human capital tax by γ
1−γ%, because x = α
2γτk + α
2(1 − γ)τh. As a result, with a higher
γ the same amount of increase in physical capital income tax leads to a higher amount of
decrease in the human capital income tax (a stronger market size effect). Lastly with a
higher value of labor supply elasticity () human capital taxation becomes more distortional.
In summary, with a high value of elasticity of marginal utility (σ), a high capital share (γ)
and a high value of labor supply elasticity (), the total effect of physical capital taxation on
growth is positive. As a result, increasing in the physical capital tax rate stimulate growth.
16Our results are consistent with the proposition 6 in Long and Pelloni (2011) which is noticed by us until
the completion stage of this chapter.
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4.6.3 Effect on welfare
First we could express the welfare in the steady state as
W =
(cl)1−σ
(1− σ)(ρ− g + gσ) −
1
ρ(1− σ) .
The welfare function is in terms of (τk, g, x), because both c and l are functions of (τk, g.
x).
c =
(1− x)(σg + ρ)η
α(1− α)(1− τk) −
gη(αγ + 1− α)
1− α ,
l = 1− σg + ρ
B
.



















where the first term is the growth effect, and the last two terms are the level effect. For








































α(1− α)(1− τk) −
η(αγ + 1− α)
















(ρ− g + gσ)2 . (143)
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, we have sign (dW
dτk
)= sign (W¯ ).
Proposition 8: If σ > 1 + 1−α
αγ
, then an increase in the tax rate on physical capital will
increase the welfare, i.e., dW
dτk
> 0.
Proof. (a) According to Proposition 4, r = σg+ρ









> 0. As a result of that, if dg
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ρ− g + gσ =
ηΩ
α(1− α)(1− τk) ,
where
Ω = (1− x)σ − σg + ρ
σg + ρ− g
[
(α2(1− γ)− x+ α2γτk)σ − 1 + x+ α(αγ + 1− α)(1− τk)
]
.
Since σ > 1 + 1−α
αγ




σ−1 , as a result of which,







ρ−g+gσ > 0. At the meantime, when τk = τ k, we have










(c) Thus, if dg
dτk
> 0, we have dw
dτk

























Thus, there is still a positive net effect on welfare. Q.E.D.
The condition σ > 1 + 1−α
αγ
in Proposition 8 applies to economies with either a high enough
value of elasticity of marginal utility σ, or a high enough value of α. Thus, the physical
capital tax in more developed countries with high value of α, i.e., less contribution of fixed
inputs in production, such as land, will be more likely to have a positive net effect on welfare.
However, when it comes to more general cases, the sign of dW
dτk
becomes more complicated,
since the equilibrium equations are highly non-linear. We do numerical simulations instead
in the next section.
73
In summary there are two interesting new features in the model with human capital.
The first one is that we have human capital taxation, which affects not only labor-leisure
choice but also affect the rate of investment in human capital, generating a higher level and
growth effects. The second is that the monopolized sector (intermediate goods sector) uses
both kinds of capital, instead of only one. Because of this, the government should subsidize
both types of capital due to the intermediate producer’s lower than optimal demand. The
two new features determine the different results between the basic and extended model.
In summary, the government should prefer capital income tax more with a higher value
of elasticity of marginal utility σ. Gandelman and Hernndez-Murillo (2013) estimates the
coefficient of relative risk aversion (equivalent to the elasticity of marginal utility σ) for 80
countries using data on self-reports of personal well-being from the Gallup World Poll. The
estimates range from 0.03 to 3.02. The median and simple averages of the country estimates
are both equal to 0.97. The average coefficient among developing countries is 1.01, while
the average coefficient among developed countries is 0.88. As a possible implication for our
results, we find some countries with relative high σ has also a high rate of capital income tax,
e.g., U.S. (σ=1.37, the average capital income tax between year 2009-2012 is 52.125%), and
U.K. (σ=0.96, the average capital income tax between year 2009-2012 is 34.925%). While,
some countries with relative low σ has also a low rate of capital income tax, e.g., Paraguay
(σ=0.5, the average capital income tax between year 2009-2012 is 11.825%) and Ukraine
(σ=0.38, the average capital income tax between year 2009-2012 is 11.3%). However, since
the capital income tax will also be affected by the required government expenditure, as
well as how many taxes could be levied, empirical results are far from conclusive. Further
empirical evidence regarding the relationship of σ and τk could be done.
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4.7 Numerical results
We now perform numerical simulations for the model. The parameter values we require are
preference parameters (, σ, ρ) and technology parameters (α, β, γ, A,B, η). We first choose
the values of the model’s parameters to pin down a benchmark economy, and then investigate
the growth and welfare effects of the taxation.
The values of σ and ρ remain the same. We choose α = 0.8, γ = 0.35 (implying a labor’s
share of 0.7) and  to be 0.3, leading to that the representative agent spends about 30 per cent
of his available time working. The last three parameters A,B and η (A = 1, B = 0.14, η = 1)
are chose to generate the average United States growth rate. The benchmark values (Case
1) satisfy the condition in proposition 5. While to check on the sensitivity of the results, we
also decrease γ = 0.05. (Parameter values in Case 2 satisfy the condition in Proposition 6.)
It is very important to restrict the tax rates to ensure a positive growth rate. Too high
a distortionary tax may induce a negative growth rate. As claimed in Bond et al. (1996),
if factor taxes are too distortional, there may be instability or indeterminacy. Thus, we will
strictly follow the lower bound of the capital income tax.
Figure 2.4 shows the relationship between the growth rate and the physical capital income
tax in Case 1, while Figure 2.5 illustrates this relationship in Case 2. Numerical results
confirm proposition 5 and 6.
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2.4 Growth rate and tax on physical capital, case 1
2.5 Growth rate and tax on physical capital, case 2
These results re-confirm the result in King and Rebelo (1990) that taxation can substan-
tially affect long run growth in a two sector endogenous growth model. They also highlight
the differences between the basic model and extension model. In the basic model, we show
that the decrease in physical capital taxation will always increase the growth rate. While,
in a model with human capital, we have both types of capital in the monopoly sector, so
both types of capital should be subsidized to correct this inefficiency. Subsidizing physical
(human) capital will accelerate physical (human) capital accumulation, promote aggregate
activity and stimulate innovation activities, and in turn promote growth. However, since
at least one of them should be positive to finance the exogenous government expenditure,
now it is a trade-off between the two capital taxes. Thus, the relationship between growth
and the physical capital income tax could be positive or negative depending on the values
of parameters.
Figures 2.6 and 2.7 show the relationship between the physical capital income tax and
the level of welfare correspondingly.
Result 2: The optimal tax on physical capital is always positive in both cases. The corre-
sponding optimal tax on human capital is negative when the share of government expenditure
is low, in other words it is always optimal to tax physical capital to finance both human cap-
ital subsidy and the government expenditure. While, we have to tax on both kinds of capital
when the share of government expenditure is high enough.
We find that in Case 2 when the tax on physical capital always decreases the growth rate, it
could also increase welfare. This finding goes against the traditionally accepted belief that
the dynamic effect will always dominate static effect, i.e., when the steady-state growth rate
is less than optimal, policies that will further decrease it could not be a Pareto improvement,
even though it will bring static gain. However, the numerical results in our study show the
possibility that static gains may dominate growth losses.
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2.6 Welfare and tax on physical capital, case 1
2.7 Welfare and tax on physical capital, case 2
4.8 Dynamic analysis
In the previous section, we examine the impact of the taxes in the steady-state. In this
section, we take into account the transitional adjustments of the economy after taxes are
implemented. We use exactly the same set of benchmark parameter values as in the steady-
state analysis. To simulate the dynamics of the model, we re-scale the variables to convert the
system of equilibrium equations into a stationary system of equations. We follow Trimborn
et al. (2005) to perform the dynamic analysis.
Letting s = X/N , where X = N,H,K,C and Y , we convert the original equilibrium
system of equations ((112), (122), (124), (125), (127), (128) and (129)) into the following
stationary equilibrium system:
















+B [u+ α(1− γ)(1− u− l)]} , (145)
l˙ =
l
σ − (1− σ) [σBu− ρ− α
2γy/k(σ − 1)(1− τk)]. (146)
y = A(uh)α(1−γ)kαγ, (147)
c = α2l(1− τh)(1− γ)y/(u). (148)
Since equations (147) and (148) are just static equations, in the system there will be one
state variable h and two control variables l and u. We consider one tax at a time, for a given
government expenditure share x. Table 2.2 displays the tax rates necessary to generate the
same government expenditure share, and the corresponding steady state values of variables.
Figures 2.8 and 2.9 display the transitional dynamics for τk. Figures 2.10 and 2.11 display





2.9 Growth rate dynamic transition: τk =0.13
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2.10 Dynamic Transition τh =0.07
2.11 Growth rate dynamic transition: τh =0.07
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2.12 Welfare dynamic transition
Table 2.2: Steady state values: government expenditure share=0.0291
laissez faire τk = 0.13 τh = 0.07
human captial to productivity 0.6927 0.9124 0.6783
physical captial to productivity 1.4000 1.4000 1.4000
consumption to productivity 0.5372 0.6113 0.5129
final ouput to productivity 0.6145 0.7101 0.6056
time into leisure 0.2977 0.2939 0.3079
time into production 0.4722 0.4735 0.4688
time into education 0.2301 0.2326 0.2233
growth rate 0.0322 0.0326 0.0313
Welfare (static) -9.5040 -6.3724 -10.7727
Welare (dynamic) -9.5040 -8.7138 -10.5938
Result 3: A human capital income tax carries a higher welfare cost than a physical capital
income tax.
From Figures 2.8 and 2.10, we could understand the transition dynamics for both taxes.
We apply the same value of state variable (h) as that in the laissez-faire case (h = 0.6927)
as the starting point. When we only have the physical capital income tax, the steady-state
analysis over-estimate the welfare level. While when we only have the human capital income
tax, the steady-state analysis under-estimate the welfare level.
Next we assume the existence of both taxes, we repeat this dynamic method, and find
the following result.
Result 4: Both the dynamic and steady-state analysis show the same result: a tax on physical
capital income dominates a tax on human capital income in terms of improving welfare.
We could see clearly from Figures 2.12 that with the human capital accumulation, the
distortions from the human capital income tax are more serious than those from physical
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capital income tax. A tax on human capital income will decrease the growth rate dynamically
by a larger percentage than a tax on physical capital income, since it directly increases leisure,
and decreases the time devoted into production as well as human capital accumulation which
will further decrease both consumption and growth rate. Our results accord with the result
in Devereux & Love (1994) that for equal percentage changes, the wage tax has a larger effect
on growth than the capital tax. However, our result concerning welfare costs is different from
that in Devereux & Love (1994). We find that a physical capital income tax will induce a
lower welfare cost than a human capital income tax.
5. Conclusion
In this chapter, we examine the optimal taxation in an R&D growth model with variety
expansion. We first introduce a model without human capital accumulation, where final
good is produced with intermediate good and labor, and intermediate good is produced with
physical capital. As in Aghion et al. (2013), we show that the optimal capital income tax
will increase with the size of the government expenditure and Chamley-Judd result is not
robust to introducing endogenous technical progress. However, different from their paper,
we show that the optimal tax on physical capital is always negative and there is a negative
relationship between the physical capital income tax and the steady-state growth rate given
a fixed government expenditure share. The different assumption of technology progress is
responsible for the difference. Since R&D activities are always under-invested in a variety
expansion model due to the monopoly inefficiency and knowledge spillover, while it could
be under or over-invested in a quality-ladder R&D model. With non-accumulable labor
income tax distortions, it is always optimal to tax labor while subsidizing physical capital
accumulation.
We then introduce a model with human capital accumulation. The results show that
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now it is optimal to tax physical capital to subsidize human capital accumulation as long as
the government expenditure share is low enough. This conclusion is different from Devereux
and Love (1994), which claimed that the capital income tax is the least efficient method of
generating revenue in a two sector model of endogenous growth. We use dynamic analysis to
find the reason of the change in the welfare rankings, and it clearly shows that the physical
capital income tax distortion is smaller than the labor income tax distortion in the model
without human capital, while in an economy with the human capital accumulation, the
ranking reverses. Since the human income tax distorts not just the labor-leisure choice but
also the rate of investment in human capital in the extended model.
If the same issue is examined in a small open economy with capital mobility, countries
may have incentives to decrease the capital income tax because of the international tax
competition, then the ranking of the two taxes may change.
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Part III
Chapter 3: Fiscal Policy versus
Monetary Policy in an R&D Growth
Model with Money in Production
1. Introduction
Should the government implements taxes or inflation to collect revenue? So far, this debate
has been controversial. On the one hand, some studies supported a positive inflation taxa-
tion supported by maintaining a positive rate of money growth and claimed that inflation
taxation will be favorable to income taxation as the instrument to finance public expenditure
in terms of promoting welfare (Phelps (1973), Braun (1994) and Palivos and Yip (1995)).
Cooley and Hansen (1991) particularly found the welfare costs of financing a given govern-
ment expenditure are dramatically lower for economies that substitute consumption tax or
inflation tax for the tax on capital income tax. On the other hand, Ho et al. (2007) showed
that switching from consumption taxation to inflation taxation has a negative welfare effect
in an economy without a production externality.
This chapter compares how different government interventions affect resource allocation,
growth and welfare in an R&D growth model with variety expansion and money-in-production.
We assume that the economy has perfectly competitive final good production and innova-
tion and monopolized intermediate good production with both physical capital and the real
money balances as its inputs. There are large empirical evidence showing that real money
balances have a significant role as an explicit input in the production process (e.g., Sinai and
Stokes, 1972; John, 1980; Simos, 1981; Hasan and Mahmud, 1993; Alexander, 1994; Lotti
and Marcucci, 2007; Apergis, 2010). More specifically, Sinai and Stokes (1972) estimated
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an aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function in which the factors are capital, labor and
real balances and claimed an elasticity of gross private domestic product with respect to
real money balances of 0.17. As claimed in Fischer (1974), firms hold money to facilitate
production, on the grounds that money enables them to economize the use of other inputs,
and spares the cost of running short of cash. This setting of the model gives the monetary
authority an ability to influence the equilibrium allocation of resources across sectors through
the nominal interest rate or the money growth rate. Some recent literature, such as Morellec
et al (2013) and Lyandres and Palazzo (2012) also show firms have incentive to hold cash.
Our main objective is to compare the effectiveness of two fiscal policies (consumption tax
and capital income tax) and one monetary policy (inflation tax) as the instruments of the
government. In the meantime, the values of the consumption tax rate, capital tax rate and
nominal money growth rate could be negative (i.e., subsidies), as long as there exists at least
one instrument to finance both the government expenditure and any subsidies. We first show
that given an exogenous government expenditure and in the presence of consumption tax, the
growth-maximizing capital tax rate should be negative. Meanwhile, the growth-maximizing
monetary policy is deflation, i.e., the growth rate of the supply of nominal money should
be negative. We claim the results mainly arise from the monopoly inefficiency which makes
the demands for both capital and real money less than optimal. Thus, we conclude that
consumption taxes are favorable to the other two instruments. However, in the case with-
out the consumption tax we re-consider the problem and show that the capital tax will be
favourable in terms of improving welfare, and the inflation tax will be better in terms of
promoting growth.
Our analysis also relates to the other two main strands of the literature. First is the liter-
ature on the effects of monetary policy on economic growth and social welfare. Basically,
there are three ways to model the money demand: from a cash-in-advance constraint, a
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transaction technology with money as an intermediate input and real money balances in the
utility function. Several studies claimed that inflation taxation reduces welfare (e.g., Cole
and Stockman (1992), Schreft (1992), Grillman (1993), Gomme (1993), Dotsey and Ireland
(1996), Aiyagari, et al. (1998), Wu and Zhang (1998), (2000), Lucas (2000)). More recently,
the effects of monetary policy on economic growth and social welfare have been examined in
R&D models. Chu and Cozzi (2012) assumed cash-in-advance constraints on consumption,
R&D investment, and manufacturing in a Schumpeterian model, and showed that increases
in the nominal interest rate would decrease economic growth. Meanwhile, the increase in
the nominal interest rate may have an overall negative effect on R&D. Chu and Lai (2013)
analyzed the effects of inflation on R&D and innovation-driven growth, incorporating mon-
ey demand into a quality-ladder model with elastic labor supply. They found that if the
elasticity of substitution between consumption and the real money balances is less (greater)
than unity, then R&D and the growth rate of output would be decreasing (increasing) in the
growth rate of money supply. Except for that we use a variety expansion model instead of a
quality-ladder model, the main difference between our study and Chu and Lai (2013) is that
we assume money in production, more specifically in a monopolized production sector. As a
result of this, real money demand will always be less than optimal value. By which, we claim
deflation would be optimal in our model both in terms of promoting growth and improving
welfare in the presence of consumption taxes. Also in Chu and Lai (2013), they considered
the welfare effects of inflation with the inflation tax as the only government instrument. To
be more general, this chapter evaluates the welfare effects of inflation when it serves as a
source of tax revenue along with other distortionary tax instruments.
A second related literature is that on optimal fiscal taxation in terms of promoting growth
and improving welfare. It is well known that in Chamley and Judd’s neoclassical growth
model with capital accumulation and infinitely-lived agents, the optimal tax system to fi-
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nance an exogenous government expenditure involves a zero tax rate on capital in the long
run. Many studies based on the Chamley-Judd model reconfirmed this result (Judd (1999),
Chamley (1986)). However, Jones et al. (1993) studied the connection between government
polices and growth. They compared the capital and labor income tax as in an AK model,
and found that a positive tax on capital income becomes optimal under special conditions.
In addition, Jones et al. (1997) extend the model for an economy with both capital and
human capital accumulation and showed that the zero optimal taxation on both capital in-
come is due to infinite supply elasticity and should be based on three strict conditions, i.e.,
constant return to scale, sufficiently rich tax code, and no possibilities for relative prices to
affect wealth. They found that the optimal tax on capital is positive with inelastic labor
supply. Therefore, there is still a rationale for taxing capital (e.g., Chamley (2001), Golosov
et al. (2006), Kocherlakota (2010), Piketty and Saez (2012), Turnovsky (1996)). Devereux
& Love (1994) compared the growth and welfare effect of taxes on capital income and wages
and claimed that firstly for equal percentage changes, the wage tax has a larger effect on
growth than the capital tax, but for revenue-equivalent changes, they have similar effects on
growth. Secondly, the capital income tax will generate more welfare cost than the wage tax.
More closely related to our analysis is the paper by Aghion et al. (2013), in which optimal
taxation was discussed in a Schumpeterian growth model. They showed that a zero tax on
capital becomes suboptimal for a given required trend of public expenditure due to a market
size effect and claimed that the Chamley-Judd result is not robust to introducing endogenous
technical progress. The main difference between our study and Aghion et al. (2013) is that
we employ an R&D model with horizontal innovation through variety expansion instead of
vertical innovation through quality improvement. It is shown in Aghion and Howitt (1992),
that both over-investment and under-investment in R&D can accur in a vertical innovation
model. However, R&D is always under-invested in a variety expansion model due to the
monopoly inefficiency and knowledge spillover. That is the reason that we obtain a negative
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relationship between the capital tax rate and the growth rate in our analysis.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section
3 characterizes the decentralized equilibrium. Section 4 considers the government problem
of choosing optimal taxation in terms of promoting growth and improving welfare. Section
5 characterizes a special case without consumption taxes. The last section concludes.
2. The model
We assume that the model economy is a closed, money-in-production economy populated by
a continuum of identical infinitely-lived households with measure one.
2.1 Technologies
There are four types of production activities in the economy: final good production, inter-
mediate good production, innovations, and capital accumulation. It is assumed that the
intermediate good sector has monopoly power while the rest are perfectly competitive.
2.1.1 Final good production
A final good is produced by a large number of identical competitive firms. The producers
use zit units of intermediate good i and 1− lt units of labor to produce Y units of the final
good according to




αdi, 0 < α < 1, (149)
where Yt is the final output; zit is the flow of the intermediate good i; A is the fix productivity
parameter for all intermediate goods; α inversely measures the intermediate monopolist’s
market power; Nt is the measure of intermediate goods. We assume the consumer is endowed
with 1 unit of time which will be allocated into leisure (lt) and final good production (1− lt).
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Assuming P˜t is the market price level,
17 we take the price of final good: pyt ≡ 1P˜t . We omit
the time subscript t whenever no confusion can arise.
Given the price qi of intermediate good i, in terms of the final good and the wage rate of
the labor w, the competitive final good producers choose the demand functions for interme-
diate goods as well as labor to maximize the profit, thus, we have
qi = αA(1− l)1−αziα−1, i ∈ [0, N ], (150)
w =
(1− α)Y
1− l , (151)
i,e., the price of an input should equal to its marginal product in the competitive sector.
2.1.2 Intermediate good production
Monopoly intermediate producer i to whom permanent monopoly rights over the production
and sale of their invented intermediated goods are given uses both capital ki and real money







Given the interest rate for capital r and the interest rate for real money balances i , as
well as the final sector’s demand for intermediate good i equation in (150), the intermediate
good i producer chooses a monopolistic quantities of capital and real money balances to
maximize its profit, Γi, where
Γi = qizi − riki − imi.
17The numeraire in the model continues to be one unit of the final good, and P˜t is the price of a unit of
the final good in terms of money.
18Shaw et al. (2005) illustrated how we can derive the Cobb-Douglas form of a money in production
from more general specification. It is also consistent with the viewpoint proposed by Dornbusch and Frenkel
(1973) that involves transaction costs.
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The solution to this maximization problem gives the producer’s demand functions for
capital ki, real money balances mi and output zi,
mi = φ(1− γ)r, (152)
ki = φiγ, (153)
zi = [(1− γ)r]1−γ(wγ)γφ,
where φ = α2/(1−α)A1/(1−α)(1− γ)α(1−γ)/(1−α)γαγ/(1−α)i(αγ−1)/(1−α)r(α−αγ−1)/(1−α)(1− l).
Since the value of zi is independent of i, we denote z ≡ [(1− γ)r]1−γ(wγ)γφ.
Thus we rewrite Y as
Y = AN(1− l)1−αzα, (154)
where output growth is driven by expanding the variety of intermediate goods N , and capital
K. As a result, the profit Γi could be written as
Γi = Γ = α(1− α)Y
N
, (155)
i.e., aggregate monopoly profit NΓ will be proportional to aggregate final output Y .
2.1.3 Innovation
We adopt two assumptions in this section. First the R&D process is deterministic, i.e., by
investing η units of the final good, the intermediate good producer will create a new type
of intermediate good and become the sole producer forever, i.e., costing η will increase N
by one unit. Thus, the value of a new technology equals the discounted present value of the













The second assumption is there is free entry in the R&D sector, thus we have
V = η. (157)
From equation (156), we obtain
V˙ = Γ− rV, (158)
where a dot on the top of a variable represents the time change rate of that variable. Com-





which holds true both in and outside the steady state.
2.2 Households
The model economy is populated by a continuum of identical infinitely-lived households with







1− σ exp(−ρt)dt, (160)
where C is consumption; ρ is the constant rate of time preference; σ is the elasticity of
marginal utility;  measures the importance of leisure relative to consumption.
The representative household income from capital and real money balances rental, work
and dividend, is allocated between consumption and saving after tax.
(1 + τc)C = (1− τk)rK + iM + w(1− l)− K˙ − M˙ − piM +D, (161)
where two fiscal taxes are introduced: one on consumption at rate τc and the other on capital
income at rate τk. M is the real money balances, i.e., M =
M˜
P˜
, where M˜ is the nominal
money supply. pi is the inflation rate, i.e., piM is the amount of inflation tax. D is the total
dividend from intermediate producers.
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Let B = K +M , we could rewrite equation (161) as,
B˙ = (1− τk)rK + iM + w(1− l)− (1 + τc)C − piM +D.
The representative household then chooses consumption C, the time allocation l, real
money balances M and capital K to maximize its life-time utility equation (160), subject
to the budget constraint equation (161). The current value Hamiltonian function for the
decentralized problem is as follows
L = (Cl
)1−σ − 1
1− σ + λ[(1− τk)rK + iM + w(1− l)− (1 + τc)C − piM +D]
+v(B −K −M),
where, λ is the co-state variable and v is a multiplier. The first-order conditions for the
representative household’s optimization problem are
C : C−σl(1−σ) = λ(1 + τc), (162)
l : C1−σl
(1−σ)−1 = λw, (163)
K : λ(1− τk)r = v, (164)
M : λ(i− pi) = v, (165)
B : v = −λ˙+ ρλ, (166)
TV C : lim
t→∞ e
−ρtλtBt = 0. (167)
Equation (162) (respectively, (163), (164), (165)) equalizes the marginal benefit and
marginal cost of consumption (respectively, time allocated to leisure, capital and real money
balances). Equation (166) is the optimal dynamic condition for capital and real money
balances accumulation.
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From equations (164) and (165), we could derive the conventional no-arbitrage condition,
i.e.,
i = (1− τk)r + pi.
2.3 Government’s problem
The government uses a consumption tax, a capital income tax and an inflation tax to finance
the government expenditure Gt. We assume that the government expenditure is a fixed
fraction x of final output, i.e., Gt ≡ xYt, with 0 < x < 1. The task of the government is
to choose the welfare-maximizing rates of different types of taxes to finance the required
government expenditure.19 Assuming that the government budget is balanced at each point
in time, we have
τkrK + τcC +
˙˜M
P˜
= G = xY,
where left-hand side is the sum of tax revenue from capital income, consumption and seignor-
age revenue, and right-hand side is the total government expenditure which is proportional
to the final output. We consider the money growth rate as the policy instrument which is











= θM , we could rewrite and above equation as
τkrK + τcC + θM = G = xY. (168)
3. Equilibrium
3.1 Stability of the equilibrium
First ,we will determine the stability of the equilibrium. Thus we derive the optimal dynamic
equations for the system. From the intermediate goods section, we already shown that all
19In our analysis, all the three tax rates could be negative (i.e., subsidies).
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the intermediate good producers will use the same quantities of capital ki and real money
balances mi to produce the same level of intermediate goods zi. With the capital and real
money balances market clearing conditions, i.e.,
∫N
0 kidi = Nk = K and
∫N
0 midi = Nm =
M , we have z = K
γM1−γ
N
. Thus, we could express the final output Y as
Y = A(1− l)1−αN1−αKαγMα(1−γ). (169)
In addition, the final good clearing condition should be satisfied, i.e.,
C + K˙ + N˙η = (1− x)Y, (170)
i.e., the final output net of government expenditure (fixed fraction of the final output: xY )
will be allocated into consumption, innovation and investment. We now begin to derive
the equilibrium conditions for each of these components. We first derive the expression for








. Combining this condition and the final good
clearing condition equation (170), we have
N˙ =




[(1− x)Y − C]K
K +Nη
. (173)
Since we could denote output to productivity in terms of N as Y
N
≡ y = Y
N
= A(1 −
l)1−αkαγmα(1−γ), and k is constant, y will depends positively on labor supply (1− l) and real
money balances to productivity(m). Also by equations (153), (155) and (159), we have
r = Aα2γ(1− l)1−αkαγ−1mα(1−γ). (174)
20Refer to the details in footnote 3
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This expression implies that the interest rate will be lower than the marginal product of
capital in the economy, which results in a less than optimal value of the demand for capital.




(1 + τc)(1− l) , (175)
i.e., consumption will be proportional to final output. Its share depends positively on the
amount of time devoted into leisure, and negatively on the consumption tax rate. Using
equations (166),(164) and (162), we have
−σC˙
C
+ (1− σ) l˙
l
= ρ− (1− τk)r. (176)





















= θ − pi, (178)
i.e., the growth rate of real money balances equals to the exogenously given money growth
rate minus the inflation rate. Now we only need the expression for differential equation of
real money balances M˙ to finish the solving for optimal dynamic system. From equation
(152), we derive
M [(1− τk)r + pi] = α2(1− γ)Y,
thus, we have
M˙ = (1− τk)rM + θM − α2(1− γ)Y. (179)
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Lastly plugging equation (179) into equation (177) and combining equation (176), we





ασγl + [σ − (1− σ)](1− l){
(1− τk)r[1− ασ(1− γ)]− ρ− σN˙(1− α + αγ)
N





In the system of differential equations, three of them are for state variables: equations
(172), (173) and (179), one is for control variable: equation (180) and the rest are static
equations: equations (169) and (175). We next construct a stationary system by re-scaling
variables to productivity. The transformed variables are n = 1,m = M
N
, k = K
N
= αγη
1−α , c =
C
N
, y = Y
N
, and l for the decentralized economy. In summary we have
n˙ = 0,
k˙ = 0,
m˙ = (1− τk)rm+ θm− α2(1− γ)y − gNm,
l˙ =
(1− l)l
ασγl + [σ − (1− σ)](1− l)
×
{





y = A(1− l)1−αkαγmα(1−γ),
c =
(1− α)ly




. Then plugging the two static equations into the system noting that
k = αγη
1−α is constant, we could reduce the above system into two equations with only one
state variable and one control variable as follows to examine the stability of the equilibrium,
m˙ = θm+ Aαγ(k)αγ−1(1− l)−αmα(1−γ)
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×
(1− τk)α(1− l)m− α2(1− γ)(1− l)η1− α −
[(1− x)(1− l)− (1−α)l
(1+τc)
]m






















(1− τk)α(1− l)− α2(1− γ)(1− l)η(1− α)m −
[(1− x)(1− l)− (1−α)l
(1+τc)
]
αγ + 1− α
 = 0
{






A−1(1− l)αmα(γ−1)(k)1−αγ − ρ = 0. (181)
The phase diagram is plotted in Figure 3.1. Given the global instability of this dynamic
system, the economy must jump to the steady state given by m∗ and l∗. Therefore, given a
constant money growth rate θ, the economy is on a unique BGP along which consumption,
capital and the real money balances grow at the same rate. The dynamic system has the
same global instability as in Chu and Lai (2013).
3.2 Balanced growth equilibrium
A steady-state balanced growth equilibrium will be considered in this section, in which
stationarity is imposed on the allocation of time l as well as the interest rates. While, final
output (Y ), the number of intermediate goods (N), capital (K), consumption (C) and real
money balances (M) will grow at the same rate g. Since C˙
C
= g and l˙
l













Combining equations (155),(159) and (182), we have
y =
(σg + ρ)η
α(1− α)(1− τk) . (183)
From the above equation, we could express g = d˜1y(1 − τk) + d˜2, where d˜1 and d˜2 are
just constants. In summary, there are two main effects on growth of different government
polices, among which the effect on y is the market size effect, and the effect on (1 − τk) is
the innovation incentive effect. The sign and magnitude of the two effects determine the net
effect of different polices on growth.
We next derived the balances growth condition of money. From equation (178) we have
already shown that the inflation rate will be endogenously determined according to
pi = θ − g,
i.e., the inflation rate (pi) will be positively correlated with the exogenous money growth rate
(θ) and negatively correlated with the long run growth rate (g). In addition, we obtain
i = (1− τk)r + pi = σg + ρ+ θ − g.
Combining the values of pi and i, we have
m =
α2(1− γ)y
σg + ρ+ θ − g . (184)
Combining equation (184) and equation (152), we obtain
l = 1− ξyiα−αγ1−α r αγ1−α , (185)
where
ξ = α−2α/(1−α)A−1/(1−α)(1− γ)(αγ−α)/(1−α)γ−αγ/(1−α).
The last step is to determine the value of consumption per intermediate good.
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(1 + τc)(1− l) . (186)
Further more, plugging equation (185) into (186), we obtain
c =







As a result, consumption’s share of final output: ζc could be denoted as
ζc =







Dividing both sides of the overall resource constraint C+ K˙+ N˙η = (1−x)Y by N , we have
gη(1− α + αγ)
1− α = (1− x− ζc)y. (188)
Plugging equation (183) into equation (188), we have
α(1− τk)(1− α + αγ)g
(σg + ρ)
= 1− x− ζc. (189)
Equation (189) will determine the growth rate in the long run which depends on the
three different taxes rate and the values of all parameters.
3.2.1 Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium
Next we will determine the conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the steady state
equilibrium from the laissez faire case such that τk = θ = τc = 0. Since by the continuity of
the equations, when all the tax rates are sufficiently small, the equilibrium should exist as

























(αγ + 1− α)σ
1− α (σg + ρ+ θ − g) +
(α− αγ)
1− α (σ − 1)(σg + ρ)
]
.
There is also one important inequality which will be used frequently for the proofs below
ξη(σg + ρ)
αγ+1−α
1−α (σg + ρ+ θ − g)α−αγ1−α
α(1− α) < 1, (190)
representing the amount of time allocated into leisure should be positive but not exceeding
total endowment time 1,
0 < l = 1− ξyiα−αγ1−α r αγ1−α < 1. (191)






, then there always
exists a unique positive long run growth rate.
Proof. We will use the intermediate value theorem to prove that ∃ g∗ ∈ (0,∞) such that
E(g) = 1 + 1−α

.
(a) The first step is that to show E(g) is a monotonic function, more specifically we show




1−α (σg+ρ+θ−g)αγ−11−α [(σ − 1)σg + ρ(σ + α− αγ)] > (1−α+




1−α (σg+ρ+θ−g)αγ−11−α > σg+ρ
α(σg+ρ−g) , thus,
the sufficient condition for the above inequality is σg+ρ
α(σg+ρ−g) [(σ − 1)σg + ρ(σ + α− αγ)] >
(1 − α + αγ)ρ. Since now the LHS will increase with g, and the RHS is constant we only
need to prove 1
α
(σ + α− αγ) > (1− α + αγ), which could be guaranteed by conditions (i)
and (ii).







, if condition (iii) holds
true.





α(1−α) = 1, the




which is definitely less than 1 + 1−α

. Q.E.D.
Conditions (i) to (iii) in Proposition 1 could be guaranteed by various sufficient con-
ditions concerning the values of the technology and preferences such as a sufficiently low
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subjective discount rate (low ρ), a sufficiently productive parameter for all intermediate
goods (large A), a sufficiently low cost of innovation (low η), a sufficiently low elasticity of
leisure (low ), and a sufficiently high elasticity of marginal utility (high σ).
4. Government’s problem
The government will choose a capital tax rate τk, a consumption tax rate τc and a money
growth rate θ to maximize the representative consumer’s life time utility equation (160), such
that the representative consumer’s choice equation (189) and government budget constraint
equation (168) are satisfied. Since there are three kinds of taxes in the system to finance an
exogenous given government expenditure, as long as two of them: the money growth rate
(θ) and capital tax rate (τk) are chosen, the other one, consumption tax rate (τc) will be
automatically determined by the government budget constraint. As a result, we will first
eliminate τc from the system. From equation (186), we could rewrite ζc as
ζc =
(1− α)l
(1 + τc)(1− l) . (192)
Meanwhile from the government budget constraint equation (168), along with the values of





x− α2γτk − α
2(1− γ)θ
σg + ρ+ θ − g
]
.
Plugging the above equation back into equation (187) , we have
τc =
(1− l)[x− α2γτk − α2(1−γ)θσg+ρ+θ−g ]
(1− α)l − (1− l)[x− α2γτk − α2(1−γ)θσg+ρ+θ−g ]
. (193)
Lastly, plugging the above equation back into (192), we obtain
ζc =
(1− α)l − (1− l)[x− α2γτk − α2(1−γ)θσg+ρ+θ−g ]
(1− l) . (194)
As a result, we could re-write equation (189) as
α(1− τk)(1− α + αγ)g
(σg + ρ)
= 1− x− ζc, (195)
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where 1− x− ζc = 1− α2γτk + 1−α − (1−α)(1−l) − α
2(1−γ)θ
σg+ρ+θ−g .
Since equation (195) is independent of x, we show that the growth rate will be determined
only by capital tax rate τk, and the money growth rate θ as well as the values of all the mod-
el’s parameters. τc will only be endogenously determined by the value of any given x. We
observe that the value of government expenditure share x will not affect maximum growth
rate, which is different from Aghion et al. (2013), in which a higher government expenditure
share always leads to a lower maximum long run growth rate.
4.1 Effects on growth
In this section we will see the effects of capital tax (τk) and the money growth rate (θ) on














σg+ρ+θ−g = 1 +
1−α

, based on which we have Propo-
sition 2 below.
Proposition 2: An increase in the capital tax rate (τk) or the money growth rate (θ) will
decrease the long run growth rate, as long as the conditions in Proposition 1 hold.
Proof. Based on the results in Proposition 1 we know that when τk 6= 0 and θ 6= 0 but
sufficiently small, we have E ′(g) < 0. In order to show dg
dτk
< 0 and dg
dθ
< 0, we only need to
prove that ∂E
∂τk
< 0 and ∂E
∂θ
< 0. Noticing that when τk 6= 0, θ 6= 0, the important inequality
condition equation (190) becomes to
ξη(σg + ρ)
αγ+1−α





(a). To prove ∂E
∂τk
< 0, we need to show
∂E
∂τk
= −α(1− α + αγ)g
(σg + ρ)





1−α (σg + ρ+ θ − g)α−αγ1−α
< 0. (197)
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(1−τk) , thus, the sufficient
condition for inequality (197) is α2γ < α(1−α+αγ)g
(σg+ρ)
+ αγ+1−α
(1−τk) . This inequality holds true if
α(1− τk) < 1, which could be guaranteed by condition (i) in Proposition 1.
(b). To prove ∂E
∂θ




α2(1− γ)(σg + ρ− g)
(σg + ρ+ θ − g)2 −





1−α (σg + ρ+ θ − g) 1−αγ1−α
< 0. (198)










(σg+ρ+θ−g) , thus the sufficient
condition for equation (198) is α
2(1−γ)(σg+ρ−g)
(σg+ρ+θ−g)2 − α(1−γ)(σg+ρ+θ−g) < 0⇔ σg+ρ−gσg+ρ+θ−g < 1α . Since the
LHS is less than 1 while the RHS is greater 1 by condition (i) in Proposition 1, the inequality
holds. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 clearly shows that subsidizing the capital and reducing money growth
always promote growth. It is mainly because of the inefficiency arising from the monopolized
intermediate good sector, where the demands of both capital and real money balances will
be less than optimal. Thus, an increase in the capital subsidy rate or an decrease in the
money growth rate could correct this inefficiency and increase the long run growth rate.
In other words, a consumption tax is the most effective in terms of promoting growth. The
growth-maximizing consumption tax rate is always positive while both the capital income
tax rate and the money growth rate are negative.
Our results accord with the ideas in the literature on taxation that a consumption tax
is the most favorable one (Devereux and Love (1994), Chamely (1981), Lucas (1990) and
Cooley and Hansen (1991)).
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4.2 Effects on Welfare






(1− σ)(ρ− g + gσ) −
1
ρ(1− σ) .
The level of welfare W will be in a function of (τk, θ, g, x), if we denote both consumption





(1− x)(σg + ρ)η
α(1− α)(1− τk) −
gη(αγ + 1− α)
1− α ,
l = 1− ξη(σg + ρ)
αγ+1−α





The growth rate g will be implicitly determined by the values of the model’s parameters















(1− σ)(ρ− g + gσ)
(1−σ)
− 1
ρ(1− σ) . (199)
Thus, given the government expenditure share x, the government will choose (τk, θ) to
maximize equation (199) subject to equation (195). Differentiating W with respect to τk





ρ− g + gσ
[(
lu3 + cu4 +
cl
ρ− g + gσ
)







ρ− g + gσ
[(
lu3 + cu4 +
cl












































α(1− α)(1− τk) −





= −ξη(σg + ρ)
αγ









(1− x)(σg + ρ)η




= −ξη(αγ + 1− α)(σg + ρ)
αγ+1−α








= −ξη(α− αγ)(σg + ρ)
αγ+1−α





The welfare-maximizing combination of (τk, θ) is the subset of the solutions (τk, θ, g),







we have Proposition 3 below.
Proposition 3: The optimal combination of (τk, θ) requires that θ
∗ < 0 as long as x < x.
Proof. To simplify the proof, we will look at the problem starting with the point when
τk = 0, θ = 0, and any x ∈ [0, 1). As we have shown Proposition 1, the equilibrium exists
at a small neighborhood of this point. Our objective is to prove that at (τk = 0, θ = 0),
∂W
∂θ
< 0⇔ lu3 + cu4 > 0, i.e.,
l[ (1−x)ση





α(1−α)2 [σ(σ − 1)g + (σ − α(1− γ))ρ].










σ(σ − 1)g + (σ − α(1− γ))ρ
(1− α)(σg + ρ)(σg + ρ− g) .
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Because of equation (186), the above inequality is equivalent to









(αγ + 1− α)σ
(σg + ρ)
+
(α− αγ)(σ − 1)
(σg + ρ− g) ≡ RHS.
From equation (191), we can see that the sufficient condition for the above inequality is
(1 + τc)ξ(σg + ρ)
αγ
1−α (σg + ρ− g)α−αγ1−α [ (1− x)ση
α(1− α) −
η(αγ + 1− α)
1− α ] > RHS,
which is equivalent to
(1− α)l
(1− α)l − (1− l)xξ(σg + ρ)
αγ
1−α (σg + ρ− g)α−αγ1−α [ (1− x)ση
α(1− α) −
η(αγ + 1− α)
1− α ] > RHS.
Since the LHS will increase with g, while the RHS will decrease with g, if the inequality
holds true at g = 0, it will hold for any value of g.
When g = 0, from equation (189), we have
l =

1− α + . (202)








⇔ x < x. Q.E.D.
Thus as long as the government expenditure share is low enough, it is welfare-enhancing to
maintain a negative growth rate of nominal money balances. Our results support the studies
in the literature which are in favor of using deflation to improve welfare and promote growth
(e.g., Cole and Stockman (1992), Schreft (1992), Grillman (1993), Gomme (1993), Dotsey
and Ireland (1996), Aiyagari, et al. (1998), Wu and Zhang (1998), (2000), Lucas (2000)).
4.3 Numerical results
Since the first-order conditions for the welfare maximization are highly non-linear, analyt-
ical results are difficult to obtain. We do numerical simulations instead. We choose the
benchmark value as follows.
Firstly we choose the value of time preference ρ = 0.05 and the contribution of an
intermediate good α = 0.8 based on the growth calibration exercises in Lucas (1990), King
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and Rebelo (1990), and Stokey and Rebelo (1995). We choose the elasticity of marginal
utility σ = 1.5, as in Zeng and Zhang (2007). In the absence of more precise information
about the real money balances intensity in intermediate good sector, we choose a medial
value of γ = 0.5 to compare the effectiveness of taxation on the two inputs in intermediate
good sector.
Following Prescott (1986) we choose, , to be 0.1, making that the representative agent
allocates about 30 per cent of his available time into leisure. And it seems reasonable in a
life-cycle view that people spend about 30 per cent of their time on leisure, and about 70
percent of their time on working.
The last two parameters, A and η (A = 0.33, η = 1), are chose to generate a growth rate
of about 3.0% in the decentralized economy (the average growth rate in the United States
for the last 30 years.)
Table 3.1 reports the results under benchmark values without government policies. (x =
τk = τc = θ = 0)
Table 3.1: Results under benchmark value for laissez-faire equilibrium
Parameters: α = 0.8, γ = 0.5, = 0.1, σ = 1.5, η = 1, ρ = 0.05, A = 0.33
Welfare=−3.609
Growth rate: 0.034 Real money per intermediate good: 3.02
Leisure: 0.295 Consumption share of final output: 0.838
Then we assign different values to τk and θ, from negative to positive, ensuring a positive
growth rate to see their effects on welfare. We have the following result.
Result 1: For low enough value of x, the optimal policy combination is θ∗ < 0, τ ∗k > 0 and
τ ∗c > 0. While for high enough values of x, we have θ




Table 3.2 reports the results.21 Several observations are worth highlighting. Firstly,
the values of both θ∗ and τ ∗k will increase with the value of x, which is straightforward.
Secondly, the optimal τc is always the maximum value 0.2 under the restriction, i.e., we
should tax consumption as much as possible, or consumption taxation should be ranked as
the best in terms of improving welfare. The results are consistent with those in Cooley and
Hansen (1991), which particularly claimed the welfare costs of financing a given government
expenditure are dramatically lower for economies that substitute consumption tax for the
tax on capital income tax. Thirdly, with a low enough value of x, we have θ∗ < 0 and τ ∗k > 0
as in the table. In such case, the two fiscal taxes dominate the inflation tax in terms of
improving welfare.
Table 3.2: Optimal welfare-maximizing policies for benchmark values.
Optimal τk Optimal θ Corresponding τc
x = 0 0.16 -0.0290 0.2
x = 0.1 0.38 -0.0228 0.2
x = 0.35 0.54 0.0089 0.2
Our ranking is different from Devereux and Love (1994), in which they claim that a capital
income tax carries the highest welfare cost. Until now, we have shown that consumption
taxation will dominate the other two taxes in terms of promoting growth and improving
welfare in some cases as well. Then, the next step, we would like to examine, if there is no
consumption taxation, how will the government tradeoff between the other two taxes, i.e., a
capital income tax and an inflation tax.
21We only consider x ranging form 0% to 35%. We believe it is enough for calibration, since U.S. gov-
ernment’s spending to output ranging from 8% to 35% from 1929 to 2003. In addition, we also restrict the
value of τc to be no more than 20%, based on reality.
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5. A special case with no consumption tax
When there are only two policy instruments (τk and θ), we could reduce (168) to
α2(1− γ)θ
σg + ρ+ θ − g = x− α
2γτk. (203)
Plugging equation (203) into equation (189) to eliminate θ (τc = 0), we could get the
relationship between g and τk,



































= 1−x+ 1− α

,(204)
Equation (204) will determine the growth rate based on which we have the following Propo-
sition 4.







Proof. Re-write equation (204) as
F (g) =














































[α2γ(1− τk) + (1− α + αγ)(x− α2)] .
We want to find the optimal τk such that
dg
dτk




















[α2γ(1− τ ∗k ) + (1− α + αγ)(x− α2)].
Plugging the above equation into equation (204),we have




(1− α)[α2(1− γ)− x+ α2γτ ∗k ]









1−α+αγ ] and σ > 1, if τ
∗
k ≥ 0, the RHS is greater 1, however,
the LHS is less than 1, since (1 − α)[α2(1 − γ) − x + α2γτ ∗k ] > 0, α2γ(1 − τ ∗k ) + (1 − α +









1−α+αγ ] and σ > 1. Q.E.D. As along as the government expenditure share
is low enough, it is optimal to subsidize the capital.
5.1 Numerical results
Next, we calibrate the special case under the benchmark values of the model parameters in
section 4.3. And the following results report the growth and welfare effect of the two policy
instruments.
Result 2: When capital income tax is low, an increase in it will reduce leisure and ratio of
consumption to output and promote growth. When capital income tax is high, an increase in
it will then increase leisure and ratio of consumption to output and decrease the growth rate.
The growth-maximizing capital income tax is negative when x is low, and positive when x is
high and will increase with x.
Result 3: When capital income tax is low, an increase in it will increase welfare. When cap-
ital income tax is high, an increase in it will then decrease welfare. The welfare-maximizing
capital income tax is positive and will increase with x.
Table 3.3 reports the results in detail. In addition, since both the growth and welfare
maximizing nominal interest rates are strictly positive, the Friedman rule is suboptimal. We
also do sensitivity analysis with respect to the value of input intensity γ (1-γ). Table 3.4
113
shows that the magnitude of the optimal capital tax rate depends largely on the value of the
intensity γ of capital in the monopoly sector. On one hand, an increase in γ will increase
the effectiveness of the capital income tax in collecting tax revenue , i.e., a higher γ will
induce a higher reduction in the money growth rate given the same amount of increase in
the capital income tax, which will generate a higher positive market size effect. On the other
hand, since γ measures the capital intensity, and (1− γ) measures the money intensity, i.e.,
a higher γ means money will contribute less in the monopoly production, i.e., the reduction
in the money growth rate will have a lower market size effect. Under the bench mark a
higher value of γ just affects the magnitude of the two policies, decreasing both the optimal
capital income tax and the money growth rate, however, will not affect the ranking of the
two polices in terms of improving welfare. 22
Table 3.3: Results for special case.
Growth-Maximizing Welfare-Maximizing
τk θ pi i τk θ pi i
x = 0 -0.21 0.01806 -0.0179 0.0860 0.49 -0.01899 -0.0345 0.0388
x = 0.05 -0.11 0.02346 -0.0059 0.0881 0.54 -0.0152 -0.0254 0.0398
x = 0.1 -0.02 0.03057 0.0078 0.0920 0.59 -0.01138 -0.0161 0.0410
x = 0.15 0.07 0.03854 0.0223 0.0967 0.64 -0.0072 -0.0067 0.0425
22Under other values of the parameters, the value of γ may change the ranking of the two policies, e.g.,
when α = 0.8, γ = 0.5, η = 1, ρ = 0.05, A = 0.24, σ = 1,  = 0 and x = 0, we prefer capital income tax to
inflation tax if γ ≥ 0.3, and the ranking reverses if γ ≤ 0.3.
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Table 3.4: Results for special case: sensitivity analysis on γ, when x = 0.
Optimal capital income tax Optimal money growth rate
γ = 0.2 0.91 -0.008987
γ = 0.4 0.59 -0.01606
γ = 0.5 (Benchmark value) 0.49 -0.01899
γ = 0.6 0.42 -0.02266
γ = 0.7 0.34 -0.02688
γ = 0.8 0.26 -0.032660
γ = 0.9 0.16 -0.04123
γ = 0.99 0.03 -0.06044
In summary, we could rank the three taxes as follows: consumption tax (τc), inflation tax,
capital income tax (τk) in terms of promoting growth and the ranking is: consumption tax
(τc), capital income tax (τk), inflation tax in terms of improving welfare. Thus, a capital
income tax carries the highest growth cost, but an inflation tax carries the highest welfare
cost. Our ranking is different from those which claim that an inflation taxation is better than
a income taxation as the instrument to finance public expenditure in terms of promoting
welfare (Phelps (1973), Braun (1994) and Palivos and Yip (1995)). We next compare growth
and welfare costs under money financing and capital income tax financing given the same
size of government expenditure share. The costs refer to the difference in the growth rate
and welfare compared to the values in a Laissez-faire equlibrium (g = 0.034, W = −3.6090).
Table 3.5 reports the results.
Table 3.5: Growth and welfare costs of financing equalized government expenditure share.
Capital tax Inflation tax Capital tax Inflation tax
Growth cost Growth cost Welfare cost Welfare cost
x = 0.1 -0.01667 -0.01127 -4.697 -10.9942
x = 0.15 -0.0259 -0.0181 -7.367 -19.1677
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Accord with Palivos and Yip (1995), for any given government expenditure size, the de-
crease in the growth rate is smaller under money financing than under income tax financing,
i.e., the inflation tax will be more favorable in terms of promoting growth. However, in their
paper, this ranking remains the same for welfare, while in ours, the welfare cost is smaller
under income tax financing. These results also are conflict with the ideas in Cooley and
Hansen (1991) that substituting inflation tax for the tax on capital income tax will generate
a lower welfare cost. The reason behind this is that inflation tax will induce a larger de-
crease in leisure and consumption compare with capital income tax leading to a much higher
static loss. Milton Friedman (1969) stated that, different productive activities may differ
in cash-intensity, just as they differ in labor - or land - intensity. Dennis and Smith (1978)
presented a detailed evaluation of the role of real cash balances as a productive factor for
11 two-digit (SIC code) industries over the period 1952-73 and claimed real cash balances
do play an important role in the production technology for the industries evaluated. They
estimated the interest elasticity of demand for real cash balances varies over the industries
studied, ranging from -0.219 to -0.409. In Sinai and Stokes (1972) with the US data in the
sample period 1929-67, they estimated an aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function in
which the factors are capital, labor and real balances and claimed an elasticity of gross pri-
vate domestic product with respect to real money balances of 0.17 and an elasticity of gross






As we have stated in the intermediate good production sector, following Shaw et al.
(2005), the monopoly production function is derived by an AK technology with a financial
intermediation system. Capital’s share in intermediate goods production γ could measure
how developed is the financial system, i.e., with a high γ, more resources would be allocated
from financial intermediaries to production sector. Our results are consistent with the data
of average money growth rate collected by the world bank between year 2009-2013, i.e., most
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of the developed countries (associates with high γ) have a relative low average money growth
rate, such as -0.825% in Austria, -0.15% in Germany, and 0.075% in United Kingdom, while,
most of the developing countries (associates with low γ) have a relative high average money
growth rate, such as 23.075% in Vietnam, 19.75% in China, and 25.05% in Cambodia.
6. Conclusion
This chapter compares the effects of a consumption tax, a capital income tax and an infla-
tion tax on resource allocation, growth and welfare in an R&D growth model with variety
expansion and money-in-production. As mentioned in the possible extensions for future re-
search in Chu and Lai (2013), our parallel R&D growth model evaluating the welfare effects
of inflation when it serves as a source of tax revenue along with other distortionary tax
instruments. Similarly, we show that given an exogenous government expenditure and in
the presence of consumption tax, both the money growth rate and the tax on capital income
has a pure negative growth effect, which are consistent with the results developed in their
quality ladder innovation model. We also show the optimal rate of both consumption and
capital income tax should be positive and it is optimal to have deflation if the government
expenditure level is low enough. The results mainly arise from the monopoly inefficiency
which leads to less than optimal demands for both capital and real money balances.
As a result, we then re-consider the problem in the case without the consumption tax,
and show that the capital tax will be more favourable in terms of improving welfare, and the
inflation tax will be more effective in stimulating growth. We claim that inputs intensity in
the inefficient sector affects the magnitudes of growth and welfare effects. Our ranking to-
wards improving welfare are different from those in Palivos and Yip (1995) and in Cooley and
Hansen (1991), since inflation tax will induce a larger decrease in leisure and consumption
117
compare with capital income tax leading to a much higher static loss.
118
References
[1] Aghion, P. and P. Howitt, 1992, A Model of Growth through Creative Destruction,
Econometrica 60, 323-351.
[2] Aghion, P, and P. Howitt, 1998, Endogenous Growth Theory, MIT Press.
[3] Aghion, P, and P. Howitt, 2009, The Economics of Growth, MIT Press.
[4] Aghion, P., Akcigit, U., and Fernndez-Villaverde, J, 2013, Optimal Capital Versus Labor
Taxation with Innovation-Led Growth (No. w19086). National Bureau of Economic
Research.
[5] Aiyagari,S.Rao, R.Anton Braun, and Zvi Eckstein, 1998, Transaction Services, Inflation
and welfare, Journal of Political Economy,106,1274-1301.
[6] Alexander, W. R. J. 1994, Money and Growth in a Sectoral Production Function Frame-
work, Applied Financial Economics 4, 133-142.
[7] Apergis, N., 2010, Old Wine in a New Bottle: Are Financial Variables Omitted Variables
in the Production Function?, Research in World Economics 1, 2-9.
[8] Arnold, Lutz G., 1998, Growth, Welfare and Trade in an Integrated Model of Human
Capital Accumulation and Research. Journal of Macroeconomics 20, 189-206.
[9] Arnold, Lutz G., 1999, Does Policy Affect Growth, Finanzarchiv 56, 141-164.
[10] Atkeson, A, and A. Burstein, 2011, Aggregate Implications of Innovation Policy.Mimeo.
[11] Auerbach, Alan J., and James R. Hines Jr., 2002, Taxation and economic efficiency,
in Handbook of Public Economics, Chapter 21, Vol. 3, ed. A. J. Auerbach and M.
Feldstein, New York: North-Holland.
[12] Backus, D.K., P. Kehoe and T.J. Kehoe, 1992, In Search of Scale Effects in Trade and
Growth, Journal of Economic Theory 58, 377-409.
[13] Barro Robert J. and Xavier Sala-I-Martin, 1992, Public Finance in Models of Economic
Growth. Review of Economic Studies 59, 4, 645-661.
[14] Barro, R. and X. Sala-i-Martin, 1995, Economic Growth, Mac Graw-Hill, New York.
[15] Barro, R. and X. Sala-i-Martin, 2004, Economic Growth (2nd edition), Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
[16] Blackburn, Keith, Victor T.Y. Hung, and Alberto F. Pozzolo, 2000, Research, Devel-
opment and Human Capital Accumulation. Journal of Macroeconomics 22, 81-105.
119
[17] Bleaney, M., N. Gemmell and R. Kneller, 2001, Testing the Endogenous Growth Model:
Public Expenditure, Taxation, and Growth over the Long Run, Canadian Journal of
Economics 34, 36-57.
[18] Bowen, Howard Rothmann, 1987, The Costs of Higher Education. San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass Publishers.
[19] Braun,R.Anton, 1994, How Large Is the Optimal Inlfation Tax, Journal of Monetary
Economics,34,201-14.
[20] Brunner, M., and H. Strulik 2002 ,Solution of Perfect Foresight Saddlepoint Problems:
A Simple Method and Applications, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 26,
737C753.
[21] Caballero, R.J. and A.B. Jaffe, 1993, How High Are the Giants’s Shoulders: An Empir-
ical Assessment of Knowledge Spillovers and Creative Destruction in a Model of Eco-
nomic Growth, in: O. Blanchard and S. Fischer, eds., NBER Macroeconomics Annual,
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
[22] Chamley, C., 1981, The welfare cost of capital income taxation in a growing economy,
Journal of Political Economy, 89, 468-96.
[23] Chamley, C, 1986, Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General Equilibrium with
Infite Lives.Econometrica, 54, 607-622.
[24] Chamley, C, 2001, Capital Income Taxation, Wealth Redistribution and Borrowing
Constraints.Journal of Public Economics, 79, 55-69.
[25] Chu, A., and Cozzi, G., 2012, R&D and economic growth in a cash-in-advance economy,
MPRA Paper No. 39778.
[26] Chu, A., and Lai, C., 2013, Money and the welfare cost of ination in an R&D growth
model, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 45, 233-249.
[27] Cole, Harold L.,and Alan C.Stockman, 1992, Specialization, Transactions Technologies,
and Money Growth, International Economic review,33,283-98.
[28] Cooley, T., and G. Hansen, 1992, Welfare costs of taxation in a neo-classical monetary
economy, Journal of Economic Theory, 58, 2, 290-316.
[29] Davidson, C., Segerstrom, P., 1998. R&D subsidies and economic growth. Rand Journal
of Economics 29, 548-577.
[30] De Hek, Paul A., 2006, On Taxation in a Two-sector Endogenous Growth Model with
Endogenous Labor Supply, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 30, 655-685.
120
[31] Dornbusch, R., Frenkel, J.A, 1973, Infation and growth: alternative approaches, Journal
of Money, Credit and Banking, 5, 1, 141-156.
[32] Dotsey,Michael and Peter N.Ireland, 1996, The Welfare Cost of Inflation in General
Equilibrium, Journal of Monetary Economics, 37,29-47.
[33] Easterly, William, and Sergio Rebelo, 1993b, Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth: An
Empirical Investigation, Journal of Monetary Economics 32, 417-458.
[34] Eicher, Theo S., 1996, Interaction between Endogenous Human Capital and Technolog-
ical Change, Review of Economic Studies 63, 127-44.
[35] Engen, Eric M., and Jonathan Skinner, 1992, Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth,
NBER Working Paper No. 4223.
[36] Bond, Eric W., Wang, Ping and Yip, Chong K., 1996, A General Two-Sector Model of
Endogenous Growth with Human and Physical Capital. Journal of economic theory 68,
149, 173.
[37] Enid Dennis and V. Kerry Smith, 1978, A Neoclassical Analysis of the Demand for Real
Cash Balances by Firms, Journal of Political Economy, 86, 5, 793-813.
[38] European Commission, Efficiency and effectiveness of public expenditure on tertiary
education in the EU.
[39] Fischer, S., 1983, Inflation and Growth, Working Paper No. 1235.
[40] Fischer, S., 1974, Money and the Production Function, Economic Inguiry, 12, 517533.
[41] Gian Maria Milesi-Ferrettia, Nouriel Roubinib, 1998, On the taxation of human and
physical capital in models of endogenous growth. Journal of Public Economics, 70, 2,
1, 237–254.
[42] Gillman,Max, 1993, The Welfare Cost of Inflation in Cash-in-Advance Economy with
Costly Credit, Journal of Monetary Economics,31,97-115.
[43] Glomm, G. and Ravikumar, B., 1992. Public versus Private Investment in Human Capi-
tal Endogenous Growth and Income Inequality, Journal of Political Economy, University
of Chicago Press, 100, 4, 818-34.
[44] Golosov, M., Tsyvinski, A., and I. Werning, 2006, New Dynamic Public Finance: A
User’s Guide, NBER Macroeconomic Annual.
[45] Gomme, Paul, 1993, Money and Growth Revisited: Measuring the Costs of Inflation in
an Endogenous Growth Model, Journal of Monetary Economics,32,51-77.
121
[46] Goolsbee, Austan, 1998, Does Government R&D Policy Mainly Benet Scientists and
Engineers, American Economic Review, 88, 2, 298-302.
[47] Gordon, R, and Y. Lee, 2006, Interest Rates, Taxes and Corporate Financial Policies,
Working Paper, University of California at San Diego.
[48] Grossman, G. and E. Helpman, 1991, Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy,
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
[49] Hall and van Reenen 2000, How Effective Are Fiscal Incentives for R&D? A Review of
the Evidence, Research Policy 29, 4-5, 449-469.
[50] Hasan, A. M. and S. F. Mahmud. 1993, Is Money an Omitted Variable in the Production
Function? Some Further Results, Empirical Economics 18, 431-445.
[51] Ho,Wai-Ming, Zeng, Jinli, and Zhang, Jie, 2007, Inflation Taxation and Welfare with
Externalities and Leisure, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,39,105-131.
[52] Howitt, P. and P. Aghion, 1998, Capital Accumulation and Innovation as Complemen-
tary Factors in Long-Run Growth. Journal of Economic Growth 3, 2, 111-130.
[53] Howitt, P., 1999, Steady Endogenous Growth with Population and R&D Inputs Grow-
ing, Journal of Political Economy 107, 715-730.
[54] Huw Lloyd-Ellis and Joanne Roberts, 2002, Twin Engines of Growth: Skills and Tech-
nology as Equal Partners in Balanced Growth, Journal of Economic Growth 7, 2 ,87-115.
[55] Lucas, Robert E.,Jr., 2000, Inflation and Welfare, Econometrica,68,247-74.
[56] John D. Finnerty, 1980, Real Money Balances and the Firm’s Production Function:
Note, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 12, 4, 1, 666-671.
[57] Jones, C., 1995a, Times Series Tests of Endogenous Growth Models, Quarterly Journal
of Economics 110, 495-525.
[58] Jones, C., 1995b, R&D-Based Models of Economic Growth, Journal of Political Econ-
omy 103, 759-784.
[59] Jones, C., 1997, Population and Ideas: A Theory of Endogenous Growth. NBER Work-
ing Paper 6285.
[60] Jones, C., 1999, Growth: With or Without Scale Effects. American Economic Review
Papers and Proceedings 89, 2, 139-144.
[61] Jones, C., 2002, Sources of U.S. Economic Growth in a World of Ideas. American Eco-
nomic Review, March 2002, Vol. 92, 1, 220-239.
122
[62] Jones, L, Manuelli, R, and P. Rossi, 1993, Optimal taxation in Models of Endogenous
Growth, Journal of Political Economy, 101, 6, 485-517.
[63] Jones, L, Manuelli, R, and P. Rossi, 1997, On the Optimal Taxation of Capital Income.
Journal of economic theory 73, 93, 117.
[64] Jones, John T., and Ron W. Zimmer, 2001, Examining the Impact of Capital on Aca-
demic Achievement, Economics of Education Review 20, 577-588.
[65] Judd, K, 1985, Redistributive Taxation in a Simple Perfect Foresight Model.Journal of
Public Economics, 28, 59-83.
[66] Judd, K, 1999, Optimal taxation and spending in general competitive growth models.
Journal of Public Economics 71 1–26.
[67] Kaganovich, M., and Zilcha, I., 1999, Education, social security, and growth, Journal of
Public Economics, Elsevier, 71, 2, 289-309.
[68] Khan, M. S. and Kouri Pentti, J. K, 1975, Real money balances as a factor of production:
a comment, Review of Economics and Statistics, 57, 144.
[69] King, Robert G., and Sergio Rebelo, 1990, Public Policy and Economic Growth: De-
veloping Neoclassical Implications, Journal of Political Economy 98, S126-S151.
[70] Kocherlakota, N, 2010, The New Dynamic Public Finance, Princeton University Press.
[71] Kortum, S., 1997, Research, Patenting and Technological Change, Econometrica 65,
1389-1419.
[72] Kremer, M., 1993, Population Growth and Technological Change: One Million B.C. to
1990, Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, 681-716.
[73] Li, C.W., 2000, Endogenous vs. Semi-endogenous Growth in a Two R&D-Sector Model.
The Economic Journal 110, C109-C122.
[74] Li, C.W., 2002, Growth and Scale Effects: the Role of Knowledge Spillovers, Economics
Letters 74, 177-185.
[75] Lin, T.-C. 2003 ,Education, technical progress, and economic growth: the case of Tai-
wan,Economics of Education Review 22 , 213, C220.
[76] Lucas, Robert E., Jr., 1988, On the Mechanics of Economic Development, Journal of
Monetary Economics 22, 3-42.
[77] Lucas, Robert E., Jr., 1990, Supply-Side Economics: An Analytic Review, Oxford Eco-
nomic Papers 42, 293-316.
123
[78] Lucas, Robert E.,Jr., 2000, Inflation and Welfare, Econometrica,68,247-74.
[79] Long, Xin and Pelloni , Alessandra, 2011, Welfare Improving Taxation on Saving in a
Growth Model, working paper.
[80] Lotti, F. and J. Marcucci, 2007, Revisiting the Empirical Evidence on Firms Money
Demand, Journal of Economics and Business 59, 51-73.
[81] Lutz G. Arnold, 2003,On the Effectiveness of Growth-Enhancing Policies in a Model of
Growth Without Scale Effects,German Economic Review,3,3,339-346.
[82] Lyandres, Evgeny, and Berardino Palazzo, 2012, Strategic cash holdings and R&D com-
petition: Theory and evidence, SSRN eLibrary.
[83] Manfred Stadler, 2006, Education and Innovation as Twin-Engines of growth, Tinger
Diskussionsbeitrag working paper 302.
[84] Michael B. Devereux; David R.F. Love, 1994, The Effects of Factor Taxation in a
Two-Sector Model of Endogenous Growth. The Canadian Journal of Economics ,27, 3,
509-536.
[85] Milton H. Marquis and Kevin L. Reffett, 1994, New Technology Spillovers into the
Payment System, The Economic Journal,104,1123-1138.
[86] Morellec, E., B. Nikolov, and F. Zucchi, 2009, Competition, Cash Holdings, and Fi-
nancing Decisions, SSRN eLibrary.
[87] Mulligan, Casey B., and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 1993, Transitional Dynamics in Two
Sector Models of Endogenous Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, 739-73.
[88] Nstor Gandelman and Rubn Hernndez-Murillo, 2013, Risk Aversion at the Country
Level, Working Paper 2014-005A, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
[89] OECD (1999). Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 1999, Benchmark- ing
Knowledge-based Economies, Paris.
[90] PA Diamond, JA Mirrlees, 1971, Optimal Taxation and Public Production I:. Produc-
tion Efficiency. The American Economic Review, 61, 1 ,8-27.
[91] Palivos, Theodore, and Chong K.Yip., 1995, Government Expenditure Financing
in an Endogenous Growth Model: A Comparison, Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking,27,1159-78.
[92] Peretto, P., 1998, Technological Change and Population Growth. Journal of Economic
Growth 3, 4, 283-311.
124
[93] Peretto, P., 2003, Fiscal Policy and Long-Run Growth in R&D Based Models with
Endogenous Market Structure, Journal of Economic Growth 8, 325-347.
[94] Phelps, Edmund S., 1973, Inflation in the Theory of Public Finance, Swedish Journal
of Economics,75,67-82.
[95] Piketty, T, and E. Saez, 2012. A Theory of Optimal Capital Taxation.NBER Working
Paper, 17989.
[96] Prescott, E.C., 1986, Theory Ahead of Business Cycle Measurement, Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, Fall.
[97] Rebelo, S., 1991, Long-run Policy Analysis and Long-Run Growth, Journal of Political
Economy 99, 500-521.
[98] Redding, Stephen, 1996, The Low-Skill, Low-Quality Trap: Strategic Complementari-
ties between Human Capital and R&D, Economic Journal 106, 458-70.
[99] Robert G. King, Sergio Rebelo, 1990, Public Policy and Economic Growth: Developing
Neoclassical Implications. Journal of Political Economy 98, No. 5 part 2 5126-5150.
[100] Romer, P., 1986, Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth, Journal of Political Econ-
omy 94, 1002-37.
[101] Romer, P., 1990, Endogenous Technological Change, Journal of Political Economy,
S71-S102.
[102] Romer, P., 1993a, Two Strategies for Economic Development: Using Ideas and Produc-
ing Ideas, in Summers,-Lawrence-H. and Shah,-Shekhar eds. Proceedings of the World
Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics, 1992: Supplement to The World
Bank Economic Review and The World Bank Research Observer. Washington, D.C.:
World Bank, 63-91.
[103] Romer, P., 1993b, Idea Gaps and Object Gaps in Economic Development, Journal of
Monetary Economics, 32, 3, 543-73.
[104] Sapir, Andr, Philippe Aghion, Giuseppe Bertola, Martin Hellwig, Jean Pisani- Ferry,
Dariusz Rosati and Helen Wallace, 2004, An Agenda for a Growing Europe, The Sapir
Report, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
[105] Schreft, Stacey L., 1992, Welfare-improving credit controls, Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, Elsevier, 30, 1, 57-72.
[106] Segerstrom, P.S., 1998, Endogenous Growth without Scale Effects, American Economic
Review 88, 1290-1310.
125
[107] Shaw, M., Lai, C., Chang,W., 2005, Anticipated policy and endogenous growth in
a small open monetary economy, Journal of International Money and Finance 24, 5,
719743.
[108] Simos, E. O. 1981, Real Money Balances as a Productive Input: Further Evidence,
Journal of Monetary Economics 7, 207-225.
[109] Sinai, A. and Stokes, H. J. 1972, Real money balances: an omitted variable from the
production function, Review of Economics and Statistics, 54, 290.
[110] Stanley Fischer, 1983, Inflation and Growth, Working Paper No. 1235.
[111] Stadler, M., 2012, Engines of Growth: Education and Innovation, Review of Economic-
s, 63, 113-124.
[112] Stokey, N.L., Rebelo, S., 1995, Growth effects of flat-rate taxes. Journal of Political
Economy 103, 519-550.27.
[113] Trimborn, T., K.-J. Koch, and T. M. Steger 2005, Multi-Dimensional Transitional
Dynamics: A Simple Numerical Procedure. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 12, 3, 1C19.
[114] Turnovsky, Stephen J, 1996, Optimal tax, debt, and expenditure policies in a growing
economy. Journal of Public Economics, 60, 1, 21–44.
[115] Turnovsky, Stephen J, 2000. Fiscal policy, elastic labor supply, and endogenous growth
.Journal of Monetary Economics 45, 1, 185–210.
[116] Volker grossmann, 2006, How to Promote R&D-based Growth? Public Education
Expenditure on Scientists and Engineers versus R&D Subsidies, Journal of Macroeco-
nomics, Elsevier, 29, 4, 891-911.
[117] Wu, Yangru and Junxi Zhang, 1998, Endogenous Growth and the Welfare Costs of
Inflation: A Reconsideration, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 22, 46583.
[118] Wu, Yangru and Junxi Zhang, 2000, Monopolistic Competition, Increasing Returns to
Scale, and the Welfare Costs of Inflation, Journal of Monetary Economics, 46, 41740.
[119] Yan WANG and Yudong YAO, 2003, Sources of China’s economic growth 1952C1999:
incorporating human capital accumulation, China Economic Review, 14, 1, 32-52.
[120] Young, A., 1998, Growth without Scale Effects, Journal of Political Economy 106,
41-63.
[121] Zeng, Jinli, 2003, Reexamining the Interactions between Innovation and Capital Ac-
cumulation, Journal of Macroeconomics, 25, 4.
126
[122] Zeng, Jinli, 1997, Physical and Human Capital Accumulation, R&D and Economic
Growth, Southern Economic Journal 63, 1023-38.
[123] Zeng, Jinli, and Jie Zhang, 2007, Subsidies in an R&D Growth Model with Elastic
Labor, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 31, 861-886.
[124] eng, Jinli and Zhang, Jie, 2002, Long-run growth effects of taxation in a non-scale
growth model with innovation, Economics Letters, Elsevier, 75, 3, 391-403.
[125] Zeng, Jinli, 2001, Innovative vs. Imitative R&D and Economic Growth, Journal of
Development Economics 64, 499-528.
[126] Zhang, Jie and Casagrande, Richard, 1998, Fertility, growth, and flat-rate taxation for
education subsidies, Economics Letters, Elsevier, 60, 2, 209-216.
127
Z
